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25 October 1984

USSR REPORT

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No 7, July 1984

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NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, ARMS CONTROL SEEN LINKED

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[Article by P. V. Vladimirov: "An Important Aspect of the Struggle Against the Nuclear Threat"]

[Text] The elimination of the threat of nuclear war is the key to the survival of the human race and the main prerequisite for the resolution of all global problems--for the simple reason that if the human race does not survive there will be no one left to solve these problems. There is also no doubt that the alleviation and eventual eradication of the nuclear threat by means of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons would make huge quantities of material, intellectual and other resources available for the attainment of constructive goals.

The struggle against the nuclear threat has its own system of coordinates. It presupposes effective action on the "vertical" and "horizontal" planes. The "vertical" nuclear arms race signifies the continued accumulation, perfection and deployment of nuclear weapons by the countries already possessing them, while the "horizontal" race signifies the potential acquisition of such weapons by states not included among the nuclear powers at the present time.

Although the "vertical" and "horizontal" aspects of the struggle against the nuclear threat can be separated on the conceptual level, they actually reinforce and supplement one another and constitute a single entity. There must never, however, be any kind of artificial connection between them. It would be wrong to call one of these goals a preliminary condition for the attainment of the other, as this would lead to the attainment of neither.

The main objective of the present day consists in a "vertical" and "horizontal" freeze on nuclear weapons, followed by the limitation and reduction of these weapons to the point of their complete elimination.

It is quite obvious that the limitation of nuclear weapons and the guaranteed nonproliferation of nuclear arms should be regarded as parallel goals in the efforts to keep the peace and prevent war. Progress in the attainment of any of these goals promotes (either directly or indirectly) progress in the attainment of the other. As the Palme Commission report correctly emphasizes,

"the prevention of nuclear proliferation is the key element in any international attempt to stop and reverse the nuclear arms race and maintain international peace and security. Progress in this direction will require both nuclear and non-nuclear states to take a responsible approach and assume the appropriate commitments."¹

On the other hand, although the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons is part of the problem of eliminating the nuclear threat, it has its own distinctive feature. This feature is that the struggle to combat the spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world is being fought on two levels: political and technological.

1

Measures of a general political nature are intended primarily to keep non-nuclear states from having a motive to acquire nuclear weapons. The main aspect of this part of the struggle consists in heightening the prestige of the existing nonproliferation regulations, centering around the 1970 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Efforts in this area are reducing the incentive of non-nuclear states to acquire their own nuclear weapons. It is obvious that the aims of these efforts, the reduction and eventual elimination of motives for the acquisition of nuclear weapons, will depend largely on the overall improvement of the political climate in the world, a return to political and military detente, the elimination of seats of conflict in the world's hot spots and progress in the limitation of the arms race and in disarmament.

The years that have gone by since the nuclear nonproliferation treaty was concluded have quite cogently proved that it is an effective international instrument, capable of performing its assigned functions. Articles 1 and 2 of the treaty, its key elements, list the mutual commitments of nuclear and non-nuclear states. The former pledged not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, while the latter pledged not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The treaty is an important means of restricting the spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world and therefore a solid guarantee of international security. The treaty also laid a strong foundation for cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy by promoting its development in the interests of all states, including the developing countries. This is why all states--nuclear and non-nuclear, large and small, developed and developing--should have an interest in the reinforcement of the nonproliferation treaty and all of the international regulations connected with it.

The majority of non-nuclear countries justifiably believe that the nonproliferation regulations represent the initial step toward nuclear disarmament. One of the most important aims of the treaty is progress in the area of nuclear disarmament. This was precisely the reason for the inclusion of Article 6, which says that each of the parties to the treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international

control. This article is quite significant because this was the first time the nuclear states signed an international agreement containing a pledge to pursue negotiations on the broadest range of questions pertaining to nuclear disarmament.

This is why it is quite understandable that tangible results in the limitation of the nuclear arms race and in nuclear disarmament should occupy an important place in the efforts to reinforce the international regulations governing the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. This is a particularly important aspect of the struggle in view of the Geneva conference scheduled for 1985 to review the operation of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. As we know, the fulfillment of the pledge recorded in Article 6 was the focus of attention at the two earlier conferences. The absence of a consensus on this matter was the main reason for the failure to adopt a final document at the 1980 conference.

The fulfillment of Article 6 of the nonproliferation treaty would be promoted by the compilation, adoption and gradual implementation of a nuclear disarmament program. A draft program compiled by the Soviet Union is lying idle on the desk of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, solely through the fault of the United States and its closest allies. The USSR is willing to reach an agreement on the appropriate control measures to guarantee the implementation of this program by the nuclear states. The IAEA's experience in this kind of control could be put to use for this purpose.

A general and complete ban on nuclear tests would play an important role in both "vertical" and "horizontal" nonproliferation. This is also specifically mentioned in the nonproliferation treaty. This would set up physical obstacles to inhibit the development of new types and systems of nuclear weapons, and this, in turn, would aid in preventing the emergence of new nuclear states. Several of the countries which have not signed the treaty are now rationalizing their refusal to do so by demanding that non-nuclear states pledge never to acquire these weapons while the nuclear countries continue to perfect and augment their arsenals and test nuclear devices. In connection with this, the non-nuclear countries--both party and not party to the treaty--justifiably feel that a total ban on nuclear tests would be an important step toward the prevention of nuclear proliferation and, consequently, the reinforcement of nonproliferation regulations in general.

The conclusion of a treaty on a general and complete nuclear test ban would also do much to prevent tests by states with the potential to manufacture nuclear weapons. This treaty would obligate the non-nuclear states party to it to acknowledge limitations on the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices (and thereby consciously renounce any of the political "advantages" accruing from nuclear tests as evidence of the possession of nuclear weapons). In this way, it would create more favorable conditions in general for the struggle against the spread of nuclear weapons, and its signing by countries not party to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty could be a prelude to their subscription to that treaty as well.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly confirmed its willingness to take the broadest measures to effect the complete prohibition and cessation of nuclear tests.

It advocates the drafting of the appropriate agreement at a disarmament conference and feels that the "Basic Provisions of the Treaty on the General and Complete Prohibition of Nuclear Tests," submitted by the USSR at the 37th session of the UN General Assembly, could represent an excellent basis for this.

The USSR has proposed that a moratorium on all nuclear explosions be declared prior to the conclusion of this kind of treaty. It is prepared to take a practical step toward this goal by enacting the Soviet-American treaties on the limitation of underground nuclear tests (1973) and on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (1976), but it will naturally do this only if the United States should also do so.

The position taken by the United States with regard to these threshold treaties and the total nuclear test ban testifies that even this arms limitation measure will be sacrificed to the Pentagon's projected nuclear programs for the development and manufacture of around 17,000 new nuclear munitions within the next 6 years. Whereas Washington previously tried to conceal its unconstructive approach with references to the difficulty control entails and with other specious arguments, a recently published response by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to a request by a congressional committee completely clarifies the matter. Nuclear tests, the response says, are necessary for the development and modernization of warheads, the maintenance of the reliability of existing weapons and the assessment of the impact of nuclear weapon use.

Security safeguards for the non-nuclear countries which have pledged not to acquire nuclear weapons or to have them on their territory constitute one important way of setting spatial limits on the nuclear arms race. The majority of experts on international affairs agree that countries which have signed the nonproliferation treaty have voluntarily given up the chance to resort to the use of nuclear weapons in the event of confrontations with nuclear states. They therefore have the right to demand that all nuclear states pledge not to use nuclear weapons against them to compensate them for the refusal to acquire nuclear weapons. This means of safeguarding the security of non-nuclear countries would strengthen nonproliferation regulations.

It should be borne in mind that the nuclear nonproliferation treaty in itself heightens the security of non-nuclear states. In connection with this treaty, the UN Security Council adopted resolution No 255 (1968) which qualifies aggression with the use of nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear state as grounds for immediate action by the Security Council, and especially by its permanent members, in accordance with the obligations stipulated in the UN Charter. When this resolution was adopted, the Soviet Union joined the United States and England in reaffirming the intention to seek immediate action from the Security Council to support, in accordance with the UN Charter, any non-nuclear state which has signed the treaty and is the target of aggression or threats of aggression with the use of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union advocates the adoption of even stronger security safeguards for the non-nuclear countries. At the first special session of the UN General

Assembly on disarmament in 1978, it announced that it would never use nuclear weapons against states which refuse to manufacture and acquire such weapons and do not have them on their territory. At the 33d session of the UN General Assembly that same year, the USSR submitted a draft international convention on this matter, envisaging the assumption of a commitment by the nuclear states "not to use nuclear weapons or threaten their use against the non-nuclear parties to this convention which have refused to produce and acquire nuclear weapons and do not have nuclear weapons on their territory or anywhere whatsoever under their jurisdiction or control." Stronger security safeguards for the non-nuclear countries are also the aim of the USSR proposal that all nuclear states take a first step toward the conclusion of this convention by issuing identical or similar statements on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states not having these weapons on their territory. The USSR is also willing to conclude bilateral agreements on this matter with any of these non-nuclear states.

In contrast to the USSR, the United States has displayed an obvious reluctance to assume any precise commitments on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. It announced that it would not use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear states which have signed the nonproliferation treaty or have assumed some other commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, but with an extremely significant stipulation: The pledge will not apply to cases in which the United States or its allies are attacked by a non-nuclear state which is an ally of a nuclear state or which undertakes this attack with the assistance or support of a nuclear state.

The American wording actually secures the United States' right to decide when nuclear weapons can be used against a non-nuclear state. What is more, it does not exclude the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons in the event of an armed conflict between two non-nuclear states which are allies of different nuclear powers.

The creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world could be of special importance among the measures to prevent the "horizontal" proliferation of nuclear weapons. There is no question that the creation of such zones will not only reduce the danger of nuclear war but could also promote the development of regional cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Obviously, an agreement on non-nuclear zones would be an important addition to the nonproliferation treaty. It is no coincidence that the articles of the treaty do not exclude the possibility of creating nuclear-free zones and even encourage their creation. Article 7, in particular, says that the treaty confirms the right of any group of states to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their territory. In some respects, the draft agreements on the nuclear-free zone are more expansive than the provisions of the treaty because they presuppose not only the non-nuclear countries' refusal to acquire nuclear weapons but also to allow any other country's nuclear weapons to be present in any form whatsoever within the zone. They also include pledges not to use nuclear weapons against these countries by states located outside the zone.

The nuclear-free zones are the product of the efforts of non-nuclear countries and of their desire to contribute to the reinforcement of regional security. Now that the developing countries are playing an increasingly important role in world politics, these regional measures can strengthen nonproliferation regulations and become an important basis for nuclear disarmament in general. In this connection, it is significant that ideas relating to non-nuclear zones are being updated within the UN framework with the active participation of the developing states and the USSR.

At present the region free of nuclear weapons in Latin America is an actual nuclear-free zone, acknowledged within the region and by the nuclear powers. It is supported by the proper international legal structure (the Tlatelolco Treaty). In spite of its flaws (particularly the non-participation of five countries on the continent, including Brazil, Argentina and Chile), it is nevertheless a universally acknowledged fact that it is strengthening non-proliferation regulations considerably and could serve as an example for other non-nuclear countries in their attempts to contribute to the consolidation of their own security. It is extremely important to reinforce the international legal regulations governing this zone by striving for the inclusion of all regional states in this legal structure, particularly countries with a developed nuclear industry.

In accordance with its principled position, the USSR signed and ratified the Additional Protocol II to the treaty, envisaging the assumption of commitments by all nuclear powers to respect the status of the denuclearized zone in their relations with the states party to the treaty. It has always been in favor of declaring Africa and the Middle East to be denuclearized zones along with Latin America, and it supports the proposed creation of such zones in other regions, particularly northern Europe and the Balkans. The Soviet Union has declared its essentially positive attitude toward Sweden's idea of creating a zone free of battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe along the line dividing the NATO countries from the Warsaw Pact states, but it has suggested that the geographic boundaries of this zone be expanded.

Proposals on the creation of nuclear-free zones have been viewed negatively by the Western powers, especially the United States, which opposes their creation in regions where this would affect its own military strategic interests. This position stems from the U.S. and NATO attempts to maintain political influence and long-term military presence in key regions. When proposals on nuclear-free zones are discussed in international organizations, the Western powers usually declare that these zones can be created only if this "does not disrupt the balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact or give military advantages to either side."² Obviously, this demand in itself sounds fair, but the NATO leaders interpret it to mean that the creation of nuclear-free zones could supposedly disrupt the "balance of power in the world," and in favor of the Soviet Union. These arguments are voiced more loudly whenever the question of creating nuclear-free zones in Europe is raised. But it is precisely in Europe, with its heavy concentration of nuclear weapons and conventional armed forces and arms, that the removal of nuclear weapons could reduce the danger of conflicts involving the use of weapons of mass destruction. There is no question that this would help to strengthen peace and security on the European continent.

The exclusion of the Antarctic, outer space, the seabed and the ocean floor from the sphere of nuclear proliferation and their essential conversion into a zone free of nuclear weapons served as an important factor in the limitation of the nuclear arms race and the reinforcement of international security.

A treaty signed by 27 states (as of September 1983) was concluded on Antarctica on 1 December 1959. The treaty prohibits all undertakings of a military nature in Antarctica, including the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the organization of combat maneuvers, the testing of all weapons, including nuclear ones, and the disposal of radioactive materials. All regions of Antarctica are always open to inspection, and observations from the air can be conducted at any time over any part of the region.

The Treaty on the Principles of the Activity of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, was opened to signature on 27 January 1967 and entered into force on 10 October of the same year. As of 1 September 1983 there were 93 states party to the treaty, including 4 nuclear powers--the USSR, the United States, England and France. These states pledged not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, station such weapons in outer space, establish military bases, installations and fortifications, test weapons or conduct military maneuvers. Therefore, the treaty essentially declares all of outer space and all celestial bodies to be a zone free of nuclear weapons. The implementation of the proposal submitted by the USSR at the 38th session of the UN General Assembly, regarding the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting the use of force in outer space or from space against the earth, could be a sizeable and tangible contribution to the guaranteed use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes. This proposal has not evoked a positive response from the NATO countries as yet, however, and the United States is essentially striving to turn outer space into a new arena of the arms race.

At the beginning of the 1970's a new and perceptible step was taken to restrict the spatial boundaries of nuclear proliferation. On 11 February 1972 a treaty was concluded on the Soviet Union's initiative to prohibit the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and ocean floor and in their subsoil. It was signed by 73 states (as of 1 September 1983). This treaty, which went into force on 18 May 1972, imposed the regulations of the nuclear-free zone on the huge expanses of the seabed and ocean floor and their subsoil. In this way, it is keeping the nuclear arms race out of this colossal region.

Progress in the prevention of the military use of nuclear energy in new spheres of human endeavor is important not only because it inhibits the arms race by keeping it from taking new unexpected forms and acquiring new dimensions, but also because it reduces the spatial parameters of the use of nuclear weapons for the states possessing them.

The limitation of the nuclear arms race, the steps toward nuclear disarmament, the general and complete cessation of nuclear tests, stronger security safeguards for non-nuclear states, the creation of nuclear-free zones and the

reinforcement of the non-nuclear status of new areas of human exploration will all strengthen the nonproliferation framework and objectively reduce the incentive of non-nuclear states to acquire nuclear weapons.

2

From the technological standpoint, the problem of nuclear nonproliferation is complex for the following reasons.

On the one hand, nuclear power engineering is being developed rapidly in the world. Whereas the world's first nuclear power plant, started up in the Soviet Union in 1954, had a capacity of 5,000 kilowatts, by the end of 1982 there were already 293 such plants on our planet with a total capacity of 173 million kilowatts, or 8 percent of the electrical energy produced in the world. According to some forecasts, nuclear power engineering could account for up to 17 percent of the total output by 1985.³ The rapid growth of nuclear power engineering's share of this output is due to the constantly rising demand for energy, the rising prices of traditional types of fuel and the development of highly economical and safe types of nuclear reactors. The rapid growth of world nuclear power engineering can only be viewed as a totally positive development, but naturally under the appropriate international control.

On the other hand, there is potential danger in this process: Plutonium--the initial material for the production of a nuclear bomb--is a by-product of the peaceful use of nuclear power. A 20-kiloton bomb requires only a few kilograms of plutonium, and by 1982 non-nuclear states had accumulated around 83 tons of this substance.⁴ It is not difficult to judge the colossal danger inherent in the uncontrolled development of nuclear power engineering.

The processes complicating this problem and simultaneously making it even more urgent had developed further by the beginning of the 1980's. Advances in science and technology and broader cooperation, including cooperation in the nuclear sphere, are continuously increasing the number of countries physically capable of manufacturing nuclear weapons.

Above all, the conditions of nuclear arms manufacture are being facilitated, and information in the sphere of nuclear technology is becoming generally available. Although the accumulation of nuclear explosive substances--uranium 235 and plutonium--still entails great difficulties, by the middle of the 1980's Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan, South Korea and Taiwan are expected, according to some sources, to obtain militarily significant quantities of plutonium as a result of nuclear research programs and power engineering projects.⁵

Several near-nuclear countries have a chance to acquire nuclear weapons and modern means of their delivery. The developed countries are engaged in extensive sales of the latest combat planes and missiles in conflict regions. Besides this, many developing countries are successfully organizing their own manufacture of extremely complex weapons, even cruise missiles. These weapons can quite easily be modified for the delivery of nuclear munitions.

Finally, even the most primitive nuclear devices weighing a few hundred kilograms can be delivered to a target by re-equipped airliners, which almost all of the independent states now have, or illegally transported to the territory of an adversary and then set off by a radio signal or timing mechanism.

According to L. Dunn, an American expert on nuclear nonproliferation, at least 20 countries outside Europe and North America are actively striving to acquire nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the nuclear ambitions of one country soon cause a chain reaction among its neighbors, particularly in such regions as the Near and Middle East. In a list of states which might join the "nuclear club" in the 1980's, he includes India, Pakistan, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria, Egypt, South Africa, Nigeria, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Israel, Spain, Australia, Japan and the FRG, as well as Taiwan and South Korea. Canada, Italy, Switzerland and Sweden have the potential for the rapid development of nuclear arms manufacture.

Regarding the increase in the number of nuclear states as an extremely dangerous possibility, Dunn says that the relative stability of the first decades of the nuclear age cannot be expected to last if new nuclear countries should make their appearance. "We are now entering a much more dangerous stage of proliferation," he writes, "in which the possession of nuclear weapons by countries located in conflict regions is possible and probable, and the danger of the use of these weapons is mounting."⁶

When the program for the international assessment of the nuclear fuel cycle was being implemented by over 60 countries, experts concluded that the state of affairs with regard to the development of international contacts in the peaceful use of nuclear energy could be called satisfactory in general. The world market for nuclear materials, equipment and technology essentially fills the needs of countries interested in the development of nuclear power engineering and other fields of the peaceful use of atomic energy. The complaints of some developing countries about the lack of access to nuclear technology are groundless, because the establishment of nuclear power engineering with a complete nuclear fuel cycle is still not a practical undertaking for the overwhelming majority of these countries.

The question of international contacts in the nuclear sphere became particularly pertinent during the preparations for the UN conference on international cooperation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Advocating the further development of cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the USSR believes that the most important prerequisite is the consistent prevention of nuclear proliferation. Proceeding from this belief, the Soviet Union has proposed that the conference agenda include a broad range of topics connected with the further reinforcement of the nonproliferation framework. It is willing to take a constructive look at other problems connected with the promotion of international cooperation in this field, which are also of interest to the overwhelming majority of developing countries. Technical assistance in such fields of the peaceful use of nuclear energy as the use of radioactive isotopes and radiation in industry, agriculture, medicine and science is acquiring particular importance.

The overwhelming majority of countries in the world correctly acknowledge that the nonproliferation framework is promoting stable international relations and is thereby laying the foundation for the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in non-nuclear countries and contributing to the development of international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

There is no question that this framework would be reinforced if more states were to sign the nonproliferation treaty. Around 50 countries, including 2 nuclear powers, France and China, are still not party to the treaty. The refusal of around 10 near-nuclear states to sign the treaty is particularly disturbing. They include such countries as Israel, South Africa and Pakistan, which are not concealing their nuclear ambitions. It is significant that the nuclear ambitions of Israel and South Africa have been discussed repeatedly by the international community. At the latest session of the UN General Assembly, the USSR directed the member states' attention to the dangerous prospect of Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear weapons.

The principal threat of further nuclear proliferation is posed precisely by these near-nuclear states. The nuclear threat connected with the acquisition of such weapons by even one of these states will not be confined to any one region.

Under the conditions of the broad-scale development of nuclear power engineering in the world, it will be important to improve the system of IAEA safeguards, heighten its effectiveness, reinforce the technical basis of this system and improve the inspection process. The experience accumulated in the enforcement of IAEA safeguards during the years since the nonproliferation treaty went into force has cogently demonstrated that the functioning of the control mechanism has not violated the sovereign rights of states at all and has not inhibited their peaceful activity in the nuclear sphere. All IAEA annual reports for recent years have noted that the nuclear materials governed by its safeguards have either remained within the sphere of peaceful nuclear activity or have been accounted for in the proper manner.

Proceeding from the need to heighten the authority of the IAEA and its system of safeguards, the USSR expressed its willingness to show good faith by putting part of its own peaceful nuclear activity--several nuclear power plants and research reactors--under IAEA inspection jurisdiction.

The USSR is consistently striving to keep cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy from serving as a means of manufacturing nuclear explosive devices. A special "Statute on the Export of Nuclear Materials, Technology, Equipment, Installations, Special Non-Nuclear Materials and Services" was adopted in our country in 1982 to regulate Soviet nuclear export policy in complete accordance with our international commitments regarding nonproliferation.

Within the nonproliferation framework, considerable attention has also been given to the physical protection of nuclear materials against terrorist organizations, criminal groups and individuals who might steal this material and use it for political blackmail, terrorist acts, extortion, etc. For this purpose, the IAEA drafted a convention on the physical protection of nuclear

material, which was opened to signature in 1980. The Soviet Union ratified the convention in May 1983 and hopes that it will enter into force without delay, regarding it as an important international legal instrument for the prevention of so-called subnational nuclear proliferation.

Measures to reinforce the nonproliferation framework are aiding in the expansion of international mutually beneficial cooperation by states in the use of the energy of the peaceful atom, and this, in turn, objectively strengthens the nonproliferation framework.

3

In the disturbing international atmosphere of the 1980's, the struggle against the spread of nuclear weapons has become particularly important. Many renowned scholars, including Americans H. York, H. Scoville, T. Greenwood, H. Feiveson, T. Taylor and others, admit that the further proliferation of nuclear weapons could have the most dangerous consequences.⁷ In his book "The Last Chance," famous Canadian writer and diplomat W. Epstein concludes that the continuation of nuclear proliferation throughout the world is constantly heightening the danger of the total extinction of the human race.⁸ According to former Director F. Ikle of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the increase in the number of nuclear states is making Soviet-U.S. disarmament talks impossible because "the reduction of their arsenals...could be risky due to the growth of nuclear potential in third countries."⁹

In recent years people in the United States have been increasingly disturbed by the frequent lack of correspondence between the administration's statements and its actions in the sphere of nonproliferation. Prominent statesmen have repeatedly pointed out the mistakes previous American leaders made in nuclear policy by neglecting to take adequate steps to reinforce the nonproliferation framework from the very beginning. It was with good reason that U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT ascertained that the United States "is mostly to blame for making nuclear proliferation a possibility."¹⁰

In our own time, the American administration's policy on nonproliferation is being pointedly criticized by sensible politicians, including U.S. congressmen. At the same time, as the aforementioned State Department staffer L. Dunn points out with alarm in his book "Controlling the Bombs. Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980's," members of the Reagan Administration and the U.S. foreign policy establishment and prestigious government experts have displayed an increasing tendency to question the significance of nuclear nonproliferation with respect to U.S. security and, consequently, the accuracy of the earlier nonproliferation policy.

There are several reasons for the skeptical view of this policy. Some say that the United States cannot do much to delay the proliferation of nuclear weapons and should therefore reconcile itself to the world's inevitable transformation into a world of nuclear powers. Others, including such experts as K. Waltz, P. Jabber, S. Rosen and S. Feldman, maintain that there is no special reason to fear the consequences of the further proliferation of nuclear weapons because, they say, the destructive force of these weapons is enough in itself to instill prudence in their new owners and diminish the probability of the

use of even conventional weapons in the fear that any conflict could escalate to the point of nuclear confrontation. They feel that this situation will introduce "a balance of mutual terror" in relations between previous adversaries. Finally, one popular opinion in the United States is that the appearance of new nuclear powers will pose a much greater threat to the USSR than to the United States.

These conclusions, L. Dunn writes, are based on the experience of the first three decades of the nuclear age and on the false assumption that this experience is still valid in our day. It would be a grave error to underestimate the possibility of delaying nuclear proliferation and the catastrophic implications of this.

Underscoring the danger of underestimating proliferation, he says that the appearance of new nuclear powers could actually turn any interventionist action by the United States into a nuclear conflict from the very beginning. The proliferation of nuclear weapons in conflict regions will jeopardize the international security and well-being of the United States' friends and allies, will heighten the danger of Soviet-American confrontation considerably and will give terrorists easier access to nuclear weapons.¹¹ He recommends the reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in world politics by means of massive reductions of U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces, a total ban on nuclear tests and a U.S. pledge not to use nuclear weapons first.

Not long ago the Reagan Administration pressured the Congress to repeal the "Symington Amendment" (1976) to the act on military assistance. This amendment prohibited the shipment of weapons to countries working on secret nuclear projects. Washington, however, promised to give Pakistan military and economic assistance totaling 3.2 billion dollars over the next 5 years. The United States decided to sell this country 40 F-16 fighter-bombers, which could be used as an effective means of nuclear delivery. Even in the United States, these actions were interpreted as the encouragement of Pakistan's nuclear ambitions.¹²

Washington regularly sends large shipments of modern weapons to Israel and gives it military and economic assistance: It offered Tel Aviv military assistance totaling 2.5 billion dollars in fiscal year 1983 alone. Meanwhile, the CIA has reported that Israel is making rapid advances in the development of nuclear missile delivery systems.

South Africa has never concealed its plans to acquire nuclear weapons, and American ruling circles, as we know, have openly advocated broader military and political cooperation with this country.

American policy on nonproliferation is being criticized by Americans and by many non-nuclear states party to the nonproliferation treaty. In their opinion, Washington's unprecedented buildup of its own nuclear potential certainly attests to the baldest hypocrisy. On the one hand, the United States orders other countries not to manufacture nuclear weapons but, on the other, it is still relying on these weapons as a foreign policy instrument.

Under these conditions, states must make a greater effort to strengthen the international nonproliferation framework. They must not repeat the mistakes made by representatives of some countries who underestimate the importance of the treaty and become obsessed with various technical problems. This is a case of not seeing the forest for the trees. It is precisely the treaty that represents the center of the nonproliferation framework, and it is precisely the treaty that must be guarded at all costs. The treaty's depositary governments have an important responsibility in this connection. At the same time, the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is the duty of one and all, because it is directly related to the prevention of nuclear catastrophe.

As K. U. Chernenko said when he addressed the voters on 2 March 1984, "the policy of powers possessing nuclear weapons is of special importance in our day. The vital interests of all mankind and the responsibility of statesmen to present and future generations require that relations between these powers be governed by definite standards." The specific standards with respect to nuclear nonproliferation stipulate that states "will not allow the proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form; will not transfer these weapons or control over them to anyone whatsoever; will not deploy them on the territory of countries where they do not now exist; will not move the nuclear arms race into new spheres, including outer space."¹³

As one of the measures reducing the danger of nuclear war and strengthening, on the basis of the appropriate international agreement, the regulations governing the behavior of the overwhelming majority of states with respect to nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation is one way of securing peace and the peaceful use of nuclear energy for the good of all mankind. That is why nuclear nonproliferation is a serious and important matter which will brook no double standards. Here, just as in all other matters connected with nuclear power, the words of states--large and small, nuclear and non-nuclear--must correspond to their actions.

The Soviet Union believes that the energy of the atomic nucleus, which is becoming the property of all mankind, should help in enhancing the welfare of people and promoting their social progress. The USSR will do everything within its power to strengthen the international framework of nuclear nonproliferation--this important field of struggle against the nuclear threat.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Common Security." A Program for Disarmament. The Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues under the Chairmanship of Olof Palme, Moscow, 1982, p 227.
2. See, for example, "Comprehensive Research into All Aspects of the Denuclearized Zone," UN Doc A/10027/Add 1, p 22.
3. "IAEA Annual Report for 1982," Vienna, 1983, pp 32, 10.
4. Ibid., p 82.

5. L. Dunn, "Controlling the Bombs. Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980's," A Twentieth Century Fund Report, London, 1982, p 25.
6. Ibid., p 1.
7. T. Greenwood, H. Feiveson and T. Taylor, "Nuclear Proliferation: Motives, Capabilities and Strategies for Control," N.Y., 1977, p 28.
8. W. Epstein, "The Last Chance," N.Y., 1976, p 331.
9. "Nuclear Proliferation. Future U.S. Foreign Policy Implications," Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, October-November 1979, p 238.
10. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 8 August 1982, p 18 (No 35).
11. L. Dunn, Op. cit., p 176.
12. See, for example, NEWSWEEK, 5 December 1983, p 58.
13. PRAVDA, 3 March 1984.

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REAGAN CUTS IN 'WELFARE STATE' PROGRAMS VIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 84 (signed to press 14 Jun 84) pp 15-27

[Article by A. A. Popov: "The End of One Myth; The Conservatives Shelve the 'Welfare State'"; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] The Reagan Administration is systematically dismantling social programs. American ruling circles are unstinting in their efforts to change long-range tendencies in the development of government social policy. The attack on social programs is being led by conservative governments in the United States and in Western Europe (particularly in England and the FRG); this creates the impression that this is the fundamental line of conservatives, but this is far from always true.

A hundred years ago, no one other than Chancellor Bismarck of Germany pushed the world's first law on pension security through the Reichstag. Bismarck was motivated by political considerations: By enacting "a law discriminating against socialists," he simultaneously wanted to undermine the German Social Democratic Party and rob it of its mass support among the workers. "The person who knows that he can expect a pension in his old age," Bismarck declared, "will be much happier and much easier to control." Fifty years later, at the height of World War II, W. Churchill was motivated by largely similar considerations to order a commission, headed by Oxford Professor W. Beveridge, to draw up the first "all-encompassing" plan for a social insurance system in Western Europe, and this plan later lay at the basis of the measures taken by Attlee's Labor government.

Therefore, by the irony of fate, it was the conservatives who initiated several social programs, although broader government social activity in the West has traditionally been practiced primarily under liberal or social-reformist governments. In the United States as well, regardless of whether Democrats or Republicans were at the helm, the common purpose of these programs was the guarantee of social and political stability. It was no coincidence that the struggle of the working class for its socioeconomic rights was always the deciding factor in the expansion of bourgeois social maneuvers.

It is therefore understandable that the intensive pursuit of social policy is generally a response to the growth of mass movements or the "threat" of such

movements, while the curtailment of social measures coincides with periods of diminished mass opposition, usually connected with mounting economic difficulties. The decline of mass movements and the exacerbation of economic problems are the reasons for today's reversals in U.S. social policy.

The Period of Growth

Present-day capitalism cannot exist without government regulation of the relations between workers and employers or without a diversified system of social security and large government investments in education and public health. This activity, which is supposed to alleviate class conflicts, is an essential condition for the maintenance of at least the relative social stability of the capitalist society. By promoting the development of its socio-economic infrastructure, it gives ruling circles opportunities to engage in social and political maneuvers on a broad scale and to win the support of large groups of voters.

Large segments of the population are firmly convinced of the government's social responsibility to secure the minimum means of subsistence for the underprivileged, elderly, unemployed, disabled and so forth, to grant trade unions certain rights and guarantees and to secure social services. The main social programs have traditionally enjoyed tremendous public support. The ideological competition with socialism has also played an important role. Despite the efforts of Western propaganda, the principles of social justice cannot escape the notice of workers in the capitalist countries and cannot fail to affect their demands on the ruling class. Now that socialism has found practical solutions to many of the most pressing problems of our day (high unemployment, the need for free medical treatment and education, the need for low-cost housing, racial discrimination, and social inequality), ruling circles in the capitalist countries cannot merely ignore these issues. The desire of ruling circles in the main capitalist countries, especially the United States, to secure a strong home front for the pursuit of their imperialist foreign policy also plays an important role.

In the United States, as we know, the bases of contemporary government social policy were laid at the time of F. Roosevelt's New Deal, but this policy continually gained in scope during the postwar period. Federal government expenditures on social programs totaled 10 billion dollars in 1950 and over 300 billion in 1980, representing a ninefold increase in real terms (excluding inflation). The increase in state and local government expenditures on social programs was slightly slower but just as impressive--from 13 billion dollars to 175 billion during the same period, or approximately fourfold in real terms. In 1975 government expenditures on social programs reached a record level in U.S. history--more than half of the federal budget and two-thirds of state and local budgets, or 20 percent of the GNP in all. This means that 1 out of every 5 GNP dollars was distributed through the channels of government social regulation.

In the second half of the 1970's, however, the proportion accounted for by social expenditures in the GNP and in the total government budget began to stabilize and then decreased. This process was stepped up even more in the early 1980's.

Government social activity did not consist only in increasing social programs and expenditures; it also entailed the adaptation of the entire society and its sociopolitical and ideological superstructure. Bourgeois ideologists, particularly those from the liberal wing of the ruling class, began to say that capitalism had overcome its initially inherent flaws and predicted the onset of a new era of "liberal," "humanitarian" and "civilized" capitalism, which would allegedly assign priority to public welfare while maintaining highly efficient production. All of these ideas were embodied in the most general terms in the catchy slogan of the "welfare state."¹

J. Galbraith is regarded as the father of the theory of the "welfare state" because he consistently put forth these ideas in a number of his works. Ideally, the "welfare state" would put an end to poverty, hunger, ghettos, need and deprivation; it would provide all of the needy with public health care, education, legal aid, transportation and other services and alleviate social inequality. In the 1960's this liberal theory was elevated to the status of an official doctrine by ruling circles and it became the basis of all their propaganda. As we know, President L. Johnson announced that the United States was "on the threshold of the greatest era in the history of any nation," the era of freedom from want, ignorance, deprivation, etc.²

In the 1960's and even in the early 1970's, when the U.S. economy was developing at a fairly steady rate, when the level of unemployment and inflation was relatively low and when all of the new programs of the "Great Society" seemed to be coming off a conveyor belt, these hopes were nurtured by many Americans. Soon afterward, however, these statements began to sound ironic.

The sharp deterioration of U.S. economic conditions over the past decade, the declining standard of living of blue- and white-collar workers and the inability of social programs to eradicate the evils their initiators promised to eliminate pointed up the illusory nature of the plans to build a "Great Society" or other varieties of "welfare state." The subsequent conservative attack on social programs proved that it would be difficult for American workers and their organizations to hold on to what they had already achieved, much less make progress in this area.

The Conservative Attack

The growing strength of conservative segments of the ruling class in the 1970's was accompanied by a growing campaign against government social activity. Within an amazingly short time, a period of just a few years, the "welfare state" ceased to be the ideal which could allegedly be attained with just a few reforms and became a "scapegoat" and the main target of criticism from the Right. Government regulation was called the source of all evil and all of the United States' major difficulties. It was no coincidence that this propaganda coincided with the decline of mass movements and the exacerbation of economic problems, reflecting a crisis in state-monopolist regulation.

The conservative campaign against social programs, which became particularly intense by the beginning of the 1980's, was carefully organized and had a strong influence on the average American. Conservative "think tanks"--the American Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation, the Hoover Institute

on War, Revolution and Peace and others--published several studies which alleged that government activity in the social sphere was one of the main reasons for America's economic difficulties and other problems. Ronald Reagan was less the head of this movement than the sounding-board for conservative groups or a "salesman" of conservative ideas. The fact that state-monopolist regulation had actually reached an impasse made the conservative arguments sound convincing.

This is why the campaign against "big government," against high taxes, government spending and budget deficits and the resulting inflation, influenced the American public, including part of the working class. This helped Ronald Reagan win the election in 1980. The conclusions the conservatives drew from the crisis of state-monopolist capitalism, however, certainly did not have the aim of more democratic regulation, but the reduction of regulation in the interests of private capital and at the expense of the most underprivileged strata of the working population. This is the reason for the paradoxical situation in which the majority of Americans who voted for Reagan continued to support the main social programs. This is what is keeping conservative groups from carrying out all of their plans for cuts in social programs.

The conservative arguments are economic, political and ideological in nature and quite clearly reflect the class interests of the ruling elite.

The economic arguments can be summarized as the following. Social policy has a pernicious effect on U.S. economic development, on macroeconomics. Social spending has become "excessive" and has absorbed the funds needed for economic development and capital investments in industry. This spending, which was already the largest item in the budget and was increasing more quickly than other items, was increasing taxes and had become the main reason for the large federal budget deficits. To cover the deficits, the government had to increase the amount of money in circulation and fall into debt to banks and private individuals. This is one of the causes of inflation and high interest rates. Sharp cuts in this spending would stop inflation. Social programs allegedly had also lowered labor productivity in the United States in the 1970's and early 1980's: By creating a "class of people living on welfare," they had robbed part of the society of the incentive to perform productive labor.

In general, the aim of social policy, the conservatives maintain, is not economic growth, but the redistribution of its results: from the haves to the have-nots, from productive workers to those who cannot work or do not want to work. Taking this redistribution of national income to the extreme could kill "the goose that laid the golden eggs"--that is, the "free enterprise system."

Pointing up the ineffectiveness of several social programs, the conservatives accused the liberal segment of the establishment and so-called "interest groups" of knowing only one way of solving all problems--higher allocations. But whereas this "can solve or alleviate some social and economic problems, it cannot solve others, even if the government spends colossal sums."³ In recent years this opinion has been expressed with increasing frequency by Democrats who have gone over to the Right as well as by "confirmed Republicans."

According to the conservatives, government resources should be returned to the private sector of the economy, primarily by reducing taxes and by creating incentives for corporations and private individuals, instead of being spent on ineffective social programs. Only the growth of the private sector, they maintain, can secure economic growth, and thereby secure the resolution of many social problems.⁴

The conservatives must be given credit for the consistent protection of the class interests of ruling circles. It is true that sharp cuts in "unproductive" social spending, the reduction of real wages and the creation of Draconian "incentives" for higher labor productivity--such as mass unemployment--would make funds available for the stepped-up retooling of American enterprises, for the enhancement of the competitive potential of American monopolies and, finally, for the arms race. The fact that this means poverty, hunger and a lower standard of living for tens of millions of people does not disturb the Right. On the contrary, it regards this as the reinforcement of "social order," which has grown shaky in recent years. But even here there are limits for ruling circles: Despite all of their rhetoric, they have had to consider the danger of social upheavals in response to the excessive tightening of these screws. For this reason, they have had to resort to maneuvers and to promise that a stronger private industrial sector will raise the standard of living for many blue- and white-collar workers.

The idea that the development of the private sector is enough to solve major social problems, however, is absolutely inconsistent with the facts. It is refuted by all of U.S. history in the past 50 years, since the time when the unrestrained authoritarianism of the monopolies plunged the country into the great economic catastrophe of 1929-1933 and forced ruling circles to make the move to state-monopolist methods of regulating economic and social relations.

Suffice it to say that the distribution of private income has tended to heighten disparities throughout the postwar period: An increasingly large share of the "pie" fell into the hands of the rich and an increasingly small one was left for the poor. The slight reduction in the scales of poverty over the past 25 years was almost exclusively the result of increased government social spending, while the private sector prevented the spread of poverty only in the slightest, even during periods of economic upswing.

The political arguments of the attack on social programs essentially imply that liberals and "interest groups" have been pursuing selfish political goals when they have coined appealing but demagogic slogans and have made more and more promises to correct existing problems, because they want to create whole classes and social strata dependent on the government. In this way, the liberals supposedly secure a mass political base. Social programs have also led to the excessive growth of the bureaucracy, and these people have a direct interest in the existence of these programs, regardless of whether they are actually necessary or not. Extremist groups on the far Right view the development of government social activity as an insidious "communist conspiracy" for the destruction of "American democracy." The more moderate conservative segment of the establishment, which has recently included even President Reagan, speaks in sympathetic tones about those who were "truly mistaken" in the past and made the wrong decisions in "good faith" but have now seen the light and have

joined the conservative camp. This is how the Republican Party strategists are trying, and sometimes successfully, to encourage Democrats to leave their party.

Finally, according to the conservatives, social policy has had the most adverse effect on U.S. foreign policy positions. Turning the problem upside-down, the American Right is attacking the supporters of higher social spending and alleging that these larger allocations can only be authorized at the expense of the military budget. This, according to the Right, reduced proportional military expenditures and even actual military spending and, as a result, "weakened national defense." The conclusion they draw from this is that the system of national priorities must be radically revised without delay because the continued "weakening of national defense" could have dangerous implications. As we know, it was under this banner that the Reagan Administration launched an unprecedented arms race.

The prevailing theme of conservative ideological arguments is that social programs destroy "traditional American values," such as individualism, self-reliance, private initiative, family ties and moral principles. The "new welfare class" supposedly does not want to work anymore. R. Freeman (who worked in Washington under the Eisenhower and Nixon administrations and then became a researcher at the Hoover Institute) made an interesting statement in connection with this. Paradoxically enough, it holds up the Soviet attitude toward labor as an example. "The Soviet Constitution," Freeman writes, "says: 'Anyone who does not work, will not eat.' In the United States this precept of St. Paul's was discarded long ago to make way for the idea that the connection between labor and income should be weakened and eventually destroyed. We are practicing the first part of the Soviet rule 'From everyone according to his abilities, and to everyone according to his labor,' but we have no intention of practicing the second part. Soviet citizens are guaranteed the right to work. Would it not be better for the United States to guarantee each individual a chance to earn his own living instead of believing that the government is obligated to secure everyone's existence?"⁵ But capitalism was incapable of guaranteeing people the right to work even in its better days, and it is even less capable of this today.

Criticizing the dramatic rise in the crime rate, the disintegration of the family and the moral degradation of some of the "poor," conservatives alleged that the reason for all of these problems is the chance welfare programs supposedly give people "to live without working."

The conservatives were particularly harsh in their criticism of the principle of "equal results" put forth by some liberal groups (as a counterbalance to the traditional bourgeois-democratic principle of "equal opportunities"), primarily to achieve the real equality of black and white Americans. Ignoring the questions of class and racial discrimination, the conservatives asserted that people do not have equal physical and mental abilities and that the application of this principle would take away their incentive to work and would lead to equalization on the lowest level in, for example, education. Human nature is too complex, rightwing critics philosophized, and social programs cannot change it: Some social problems are not at all the result of the fact

that some people are poor; some of the people who are poor and live in ghettos are there through their own fault, because their personal traits keep them from working productively, acquiring an education and professional skills and displaying social dynamism. Certain social defects have always been inherent in society, including poverty, crime, unemployment and social inequality. To reduce the scales of social evils, the opponents of welfare assert, it will first be necessary to be tougher on those who "do not want to work." This, they say, would be much more effective than costly social security programs.

Conservative theorists allege that these "simple solutions" can correct the impasse in government social policy.

These principles have also served as the basis of specific recommendations. Conservative research centers in the United States have literally picked the government's social activity to pieces and have made numerous recommendations which would take pages to explain in detail even if we concentrated on just one area--for example, aid to the needy. In general, however, the import--which is obviously class-related and reactionary--of these recommendations in each of the main areas of social policy can be summarized as the following.

LABOR RELATIONS AND POLICY ON LABOR UNIONS. There should be no changes in labor legislation. The struggle against inflation demands the "limitation," the conservatives say, meaning the actual reduction, of real wages. This will help to restore the competitive potential of American industry. There should be no government price and wage controls: These produce short-range results but complicate the problem over the long range; wage reductions should be the result of the policy of monopolies and private capital. In addition, several government regulations on labor safety should be repealed or relaxed because they raise overhead costs.

CIVIL RIGHTS. Minority hiring quotas and the practice of "busing"--transporting schoolchildren by bus for the racial integration of schools--must be eliminated. The placement of some young blacks in jobs can be accomplished by waiving the minimum wage for this category of labor. Then employers will hire them for unskilled jobs.

SOCIAL SECURITY. The main problem here is financing. Although social security taxes have risen sharply, there will be another deficit in the near future. This is happening for two main reasons: 1) The demographic situation is changing, and not in favor of taxpayers. Whereas there are now three taxpayers for each recipient, by 2020 the ratio will already be two to one. 2) The size of payments exceeds reasonable limits. Taxes cannot rise indefinitely, and the long-range solution will therefore consist in reduced payments and stricter eligibility criteria. Numerous options have been suggested. The main ones are the following: cutting benefits, raising the retirement age from 65 to 68, charging income tax on pensions and canceling the automatic cost-of-living increases. The conservatives are also demanding stricter eligibility criteria for unemployment compensation.

SOCIAL WELFARE. The main welfare programs should be turned over to state and local governments. They should decide which programs they want, who should

receive assistance and how much they should get. Eligibility criteria should be made stricter everywhere because only "those who really need and deserve help should get it" and because people who are able to work should not have the right to refuse any unskilled job or other position they are offered. Child support payments should be collected from able-bodied parents, regardless of whether the marriage is legal or not; those who refuse to pay should be prosecuted.

PUBLIC HEALTH. The rise in the cost of Medicare and Medicaid programs⁶ must be stopped by setting stricter eligibility requirements for patients, increasing their share of the costs and setting treatment price controls. The latter can be done simply setting ceilings on federal payments to hospitals and doctors and informing them that bills exceeding these limits will not be paid.

EDUCATION. The role of the federal government should be minimized. Local government should pay for education, decide the curriculum and manage the educational system. The federal government could subsidize just specific programs--for example, the education of children with mental and physical handicaps--and offer relatively small amounts of financial aid to college and university students from low-income families. The states and departments of education should "regain their authority." Busing and hiring quotas for minorities in higher academic institutions should be eliminated. The conservatives are demanding that harsh measures be taken to suppress student demonstrations under the cover of talk about the need to restore the necessary order and discipline in the schools.

VOCATIONAL TRAINING, 'PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT' AND SOCIAL SERVICES. These allocations should be cut sharply and the programs should be turned over to state governments because they are essentially a local matter and should not be the responsibility of the federal government (in general, the principle of federalism is widely propagandized by conservatives, who regard it as a method of decentralizing and cutting social spending).

PUBLIC HOUSING AND URBAN RENEWAL. Subsidized housing should be limited, and the number of new projects should be minimized. The inhabitants of low-income housing should pay a larger share of the rent. Urban problems arise because the social programs proposed by the federal government and connected with large federal grants have turned municipal governments into establishments for the distribution of benefits to the poor. As a result, cities are inundated with people living on welfare, and they are to blame for the fact that whole urban neighborhoods (mainly in the inner city) have become ghettos and are hotbeds of crime and violence. People who work and pay taxes have had to move to the suburbs. This, according to the Right, is the reason for the financial crisis of the cities and the decline of the urban economy, and this is why local governments are demanding even larger federal grants. Benefits for the poor must be cut. The federal government and, above all, municipal governments must work out an entire system of measures to reduce the number of people living on welfare and, what is most important, encourage at least some taxpayers to move back to the cities.

The Dismantling of Social Programs

The real turn toward conservatism in government social policy essentially began not with Reagan, but with Carter, in the second half of the 1970's.

Whereas social expenditures in the federal budget rose at a rate of 10.2 percent a year in real terms in 1970-1976, the growth rate dropped to 2.6 percent in 1976-1980. Conversely, military allocations decreased at a rate of 4.9 percent a year in real terms in the first half of the 1970's and began to rise 1.9 percent a year in the second half of the decade.⁷ The proportion accounted for by federal social expenditures in the U.S. GNP first rose from 5.7 percent to 11.5 percent between 1965 and 1975 and then virtually remained unchanged in the second half of the 1970's, constituting 11.5 percent of the GNP in 1980. During the same period, proportional state and local government expenditures on the same needs decreased from 8.4 percent in 1975 to 6.7 percent in 1980. Therefore, the Carter Administration was able to reduce the rate of increase in federal social expenditures to one-fourth the previous figure, keep them from growing more quickly than the GNP and stabilize proportional expenditures at the level of half the federal budget. This federal policy also affected the budgets of local governments, which reduced their proportional expenditures on social needs for the first time in the postwar period.

The Carter Administration did this by using fairly radical methods, particularly by Democratic Party standards. Breaking its promises, the administration effectively declared a moratorium on the institution of new major social programs, and this represented a radical change in postwar social policy. It impeded all attempts at such important reforms as the establishment of a minimum guaranteed income for the poorest strata, the institution of a nationwide system of government medical insurance and the revision of labor legislation. Many existing programs were cut, particularly in the sphere of aid to the poor. As a result of the 1977 amendments to the social security act, workers had to pay much higher social security taxes.

The Carter Administration's actions prove that the move toward conservatism in the sphere of social policy became the general line of ruling circles in the second half of the 1970's, regardless of the party in power. The Reagan Administration could not have made as radical a turn to the right if the road had not been cleared for it by the previous administration. In several cases, the Reagan Administration simply continued Carter administration measures to cut social programs. Nevertheless, there were significant differences.

In addition to continuing and reinforcing the conservative tendencies which first became apparent in the development of social policy in the second half of the 1970's, the Republicans added many new elements to the style and substance of this policy.

Above all, there was a difference in ideological grounds. Carter promised to expand government social activity and then failed to do this, pleading insufficient funds. Reagan, on the other hand, promised to cut and minimize government intervention in the social sphere because, as he said, the government "has stopped solving problems and has become the main problem."

Taking action under these slogans, the Reagan Administration quite zealously began to carry out the wishes of conservative groups and was able to take a number of sweeping measures. However, it is already clear that it will not be able to carry out many of its plans during one term in office. Furthermore, it has had to deal with the increasing resistance of its policy and stronger opposition on all levels.

The administration's actions to cut social spending are most indicative in this respect. Over two-thirds of the federal government's social budget must be used for various social insurance programs, around 15 percent is used for aid to the poor and approximately the same amount is used for social services: public health care (excluding Medicare and Medicaid, which are generally categorized respectively as social insurance and welfare), education, occupational training, employment programs and public housing.

The paradox here is that the largest item--social insurance--is politically more difficult to cut. The main social insurance program is known as the national government program of old-age, survivors, and disability insurance for workers in the private sector. It covers 152 million people, 36 million of whom are receiving pensions and benefits while the other 116 million are paying social insurance taxes and are thereby acquiring the right to receive these benefits in the future. The cost of the program rose from 1.5 percent of the GNP in 1957 to 5.1 percent in 1983 (170 billion dollars); the rate of increase in these expenditures has been triple the rate of GNP growth for the last 25 years. In May 1981 the Reagan Administration sent a bill to the Congress to cut these benefits. The administration alleged that this would lower the cost of the program by 22 percent over the long range. But even the conservative Senate had to take the nationwide angry response to these proposals into account and unanimously rejected the bill.⁸ The problem was then investigated by a special bipartisan commission on social security reform. On the basis of its recommendations, the Congress passed a law envisaging a further increase in social security taxes and the simultaneous establishment of stricter eligibility requirements, and the President signed it in April 1983.⁹

In this way, the financial collapse of the system was temporarily averted and the charged political atmosphere over this problem was neutralized, but the rise in the cost of the program only slowed down and did not stop.

The situation with regard to Medicare, the program of old-age medical insurance, had many similar features. The administration proposes to change the formula of insurance in 1984. At present, the patient pays the full cost of the first day in the hospital (according to official statistics, it will average 350 dollars in 1984); he is treated for free from the second day through the 60th, he pays 25 percent of the cost from the 61st through the 90th, and he pays all hospital costs after the 90th day. This program covers only people of 65 or over who paid social insurance taxes throughout their working years. These taxes, which are automatically deducted from the wages of blue- and white-collar workers, are already close to 15 percent of their income; the tax collected to pay for the Medicare program rose from 0.35 percent in 1966 to 1.35 percent in 1984. Even in this form, however, the program seems too generous to the Reagan Administration.

The administration has proposed that after the patient has paid the fee for the first day, he will pay 8 percent of the cost of treatment from the 2d through the 15th and 5 percent from the 16th through the 60th.¹⁰ Even if Congress approves these and other measures to cut expenditures, however, the cost of the program will rise from 57 billion dollars in 1983 to 74 billion in 1986, or to 85 billion without these cuts.¹¹ Over the long range the rising cost of Medicare will be a major problem.¹²

During the Reagan Administration, social insurance has accounted for virtually the entire real increase in the non-military part of the budget. The fact that social expenditures are still being projected at half the federal budget is connected primarily with the impossibility of radical cuts due to the tremendous popularity of social insurance programs.

The Reagan Administration launched a much more resolute attack on programs of assistance to the poor and social services. Predictably, in the sphere of welfare one of the first targets was the program of aid to families with dependent children, which had been criticized for years by conservative Democrats as well as Republicans. For example, back in 1968 Democratic Senator Moynihan said: "The poor (referring to heads of families--A. P.) in the United States are now exercising the absolutely unprecedented de facto right to abandon their children in the certainty that society will take care of them."¹³ As a result, allocations for this program were cut substantially even in the 1970's. According to administration plans, further cuts of 20-25 percent (in real terms) are to be made in the next few years. A law passed in 1981 changed the procedure for the calculation of program benefits, giving state governments greater freedom to set the amounts.¹⁴ According to some calculations, as a result of these changes 375,000 of the 3.7 million families receiving these benefits should have been ineligible, and another 280,000 should have had their benefits cut in 1982.¹⁵ In accordance with the recommendations of conservative groups, the Reagan Administration wanted to totally divest itself of the program by turning it over to state governments in 1984. Later, however, it had to give up this plan because it encountered serious opposition in the Congress and on the part of local governments.

Food assistance to the poor underwent a radical reversal under the current administration. These expenditures increased quickly during the last years before the start of the Reagan Administration, rising from 8.5 billion dollars in 1977 to 16.2 billion in 1981. Expenditures on food stamps--the main program in this sphere--doubled during this period and totaled 10.2 billion dollars in 1981; the number of food stamp recipients rose from 10 million in 1971 to 21.5 million in 1981; the real cost of the stamps rose 1.5-fold during this period.¹⁶ The Reagan Administration and the conservative Congress put an end to this growth by envisaging the actual reduction of food assistance allocations to 16.2 billion current dollars by 1985.¹⁷

In combination with the rise in unemployment, these cuts broadened the scales of hunger in the United States. Just as in the case of the financial assistance to poor families, the administration planned to turn the food stamp program over to the state governments, but had to take back its offer for the same reasons.

The only significant program in the sphere of aid to the poor which remained almost untouched by the administration was the supplementary security income program, envisaging the payment of financial benefits to the elderly poor, blind and permanently disabled. In view of the fact that real expenditures on this program are hardly increasing at all (they are now 8 billion dollars), and of the fact that the recipients have such an obvious need for assistance that even the Right would have difficulty making them the target of criticism, the administration confined itself to relatively minimal cuts in this area.

The administration has directed its most severe blows at social services. From the very beginning it literally launched fierce attacks on programs in the sphere of education, public housing, "public" (government-subsidized) employment and vocational training.

The federal government plays a fairly modest role in the sphere of education: It bears only 10 percent of the total expenditures, while 90 percent are paid by state and local agencies (primarily by departments of education). Nevertheless, the administration proposed to cut its allocations in this area from 15.3 billion dollars in 1982 to 9.3 billion by 1985,¹⁸ or by almost half in real terms. The administration essentially wants to rid itself of the responsibility for secondary education, with the exception of specific programs (such as the education of the physically and mentally handicapped, the education of Indians, etc.).

Expenditures on higher education are to be reduced by approximately the same percentage, according to administration proposals. The sharpest cuts will be made in direct federal grants to students and the federally secured low-interest student loans. The proposal to replace the Department of Education with the Foundation for Education Assistance, a minor federal agency, should also be regarded as a reflection of this policy. Once again, however, the administration had to reduce its planned cuts and give up the idea of abolishing the Department of Education when it encountered mounting opposition, particularly in the Congress.

Federal housing assistance will also be minimized, and the results of this will not be known for a few years. The administration cannot evict the tenants of existing homes and apartments, but it wants to raise their share of the rent from 25 percent to 35 percent (in 1982, 3.4 million low-income families occupied housing for which the government paid 75 percent of the rent).¹⁹ Housing assistance expenditures will remain at 9-12 billion dollars in the next few years,²⁰ because some existing commitments cannot be canceled. The construction of new public housing has virtually stopped, however, and subsidies and loans to potential clients have been sharply restricted. As a result, budget authorizations--that is, federal financial obligations for future years--will be cut sharply, from 26.1 billion dollars in 1981 to minus (!) 2 billion in 1985.²¹

From the very beginning, the administration took an extremely negative view of federally subsidized employment and cut allocations for vocational training and "public employment" severely: Expenditures were to be cut from 9.2 billion dollars in 1981 to 2.9 billion in 1985. According to the calculations of

labor unions, this would have cost American labor 1.25 million jobs just in 1982.²² This should have put an end to government activity in this sphere, but the economic crisis caused unemployment to take on such broad scales and brought so much suffering to millions of Americans that nationwide indignation forced the Congress to allocate billions of dollars for employment programs at the end of 1982. The administration had to back down. The draft budget for 1984 proposes the maintenance of employment and vocational training expenditures at a level exceeding 5 billion dollars.²³

The cuts in several programs are deep and sweeping and they will have an extremely adverse effect on tens of millions of Americans even though conservative groups could not carry out their plans in full. It is now clear that even the most rightwing conservative government, despite all of its demagogic rhetoric, cannot change some of the realities of state-monopolist capitalism or return to the situation that existed 50 years ago. The main social programs may have been cut, but they did survive.

Nevertheless, there is no doubt that U.S. social programs are now experiencing the most severe crisis of the postwar period. The very term "welfare state" is usually used in the ironic or pejorative sense; the idea of "civilized capitalism" has been discredited. The theory and practice of the "welfare state" have been declared fundamentally incompatible with "American ideals"--in the form in which the Reagan Administration sees them.

FOOTNOTES

1. The Russian term "gosudarstvo vseobshchego blagosostoyaniya" [state of universal well-being] is not an absolutely accurate translation of the term "welfare state." Although the word "welfare" originally meant "well-being" or "prosperity," the term "public welfare" does not mean "public well-being," but the social activity of the government (in the more narrow sense, the term "welfare" means financial benefits for the poor). In the same way, the term "welfare state" is used to denote a state with a developed body of social legislation. Therefore, the translation "sotsial'no otvetstvennoye gosudarstvo" [socially responsible state] seems more accurate. But since the term "gosudarstvo vseobshchego blagosostoyaniya" is widely used in Soviet literature, it is also used in this article.
2. "Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Lyndon B. Johnson. Book I, 1963/64," Wash., 1965, p 822.
3. R. Freeman, "A Preview and Summary of the Wayward Welfare State," Stanford (California), 1981, p 15.
4. J. Ashbrook, "How Democratic Policies Wrecked Our Economy," CONSERVATIVE DIGEST, November 1981, pp 38-39.
5. R. Freeman, Op. cit., pp 25-26.
6. Medicare is a program of medical assistance for the aged; Medicaid is a program of medical assistance for the poor.

7. "Setting National Priorities. The 1982 Budget," Wash., 1981, p 190.
8. "Setting National Priorities. The 1983 Budget," Wash., 1982, p 116.
9. SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1983, No 8, pp 61-65.
10. "The Budget of the United States Government for Fiscal Year 1984," Wash., 1983, pp 5-104--5-105.
11. Ibid., p 5-102.
12. P. Peterson, "The Future of Social Security," THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, 17 March 1983, pp 48-50.
13. D. Moynihan, "The Crisis in Welfare," PUBLIC INTEREST, Winter 1968, p 24.
14. S. Watson et al, "Tax Rates and Poverty Traps in the U.S. Welfare System: Before and After the 1981 Changes in the Law. Preliminary Draft," Chicago, 1983, pp 22-28.
15. FORTUNE, 2 November 1981, p 99.
16. "Setting National Priorities. The 1982 Budget," p 58.
17. "The Budget of the United States Government for Fiscal Year 1984," p 5-114.
18. "The Budget of the United States Government for Fiscal Year 1983," Wash., 1982, pp 5-108, 5-110.
19. Ibid., p 5-151.
20. "The Budget of the United States Government for Fiscal Year 1984," p 5-114.
21. Ibid., p 5-113.
22. AMERICAN FEDERATIONIST, April 1981, p 9.
23. "The Budget of the United States Government for Fiscal Year 1984," p 5-87.

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PUBLIC OPINION ON MILITARY QUESTIONS SHIFTING AGAINST REAGAN

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 84 (signed to press 14 Jun 84) pp 48-56

[Article by T. V. Kuznetsova: "American Views on War and Peace"*]

[Text] There have been definite changes in the American public's views on war and peace in the past decade.

In the 1970's the public mood in the country was directly influenced by the defeat in Vietnam; Americans began to lose faith in the world leadership and "exceptional" nature of the United States. What is more, the military defeat of the United States and the decline of its prestige in the world paved the way for something like an inferiority complex in the public mind. The atmosphere created by the relaxation of international tension also played a part. Polls recorded a perceptible decrease in the number of people supporting the hegemonic U.S. foreign policy line and an increase in the number criticizing U.S. military policy. There was a significant decrease in the number supporting increased military spending and participation in military conflicts; there was more opposition to the draft, particularly among youth.

In the second half of the 1970's the situation began to change. There was a gradual increase in militarist feelings as a result of the activity of right-wing conservative groups making skillful use of certain features of the foreign policy situation in their propaganda. By issuing appeals for the revival of the "American spirit" and taking advantage of the public's hurt feelings, particularly the embarrassment about the alleged inferiority of the United States to the USSR in the strategic sphere and the feelings of national humiliation

* The analysis of public opinion in this article is based on a study of numerous polls conducted in the United States. The author summarized, compared and analyzed these data with a view to the fact that many responses are definitely influenced by the ideological views of pollsters and the methods they use in conducting polls.

For a detailed discussion of the institution of polls in U.S. sociopolitical affairs, see "Amerikanskoye mneniye i politika" [American Opinion and Politics], edited by Yu. A. Zamoshkin, Moscow, 1978, and "SShA: politika skvoz' prizmu oprosoy" [Politics Viewed Through the Prism of Public Opinion Polls] by M. M. Petrovskaya, Moscow, 1982.

(which were apparent, for example, after the American hostages were taken in Iran), rightwing conservative groups were able to fuel chauvinistic, anti-communist and anti-Soviet feelings in the country. Under the influence of the widely publicized myth of the "Soviet military threat," much of the American public believed in the need for an arms buildup for the sake of U.S. security and for the retention and restoration of earlier U.S. influence in the world arena.

The wave of militarist feeling had reached its peak by 1980. Some symptoms of its decline became apparent in the middle of 1981. A number of indicators measuring American attitudes toward the arms race, the arms buildup and the use of military force testify to a gradual sobering-up process. The mounting fear of nuclear war, the realization of the heavy economic burden represented by the arms race and the fear of involvement in new large-scale military conflicts similar to the war in Vietnam, played an important role in this process. American attitudes were influenced considerably by the activities of peaceful forces within the country and in Europe and by the peaceful initiatives of the USSR and the entire socialist community.

Changes in public views on war and peace were most clearly reflected in attitudes toward military spending.

In 1968 the supporters of higher military expenditures constituted the minority, and in 1971 their number reached a record low--11 percent.¹ In 1973, however, the percentage of Americans believing that too little was being spent for military purposes began to rise, and the highest indicator since the beginning of the war in Vietnam--74 percent--was recorded in 1980.² These changes reflected the increasing strength of the hurt feelings and emotions constantly fueled by militarist propaganda.

In recent years, however, there has been a more realistic approach to expenditures on arms. By the end of the first year of Reagan's presidency, the number of Americans supporting the growth of the military budget began to decrease. In March 1983, only 14 percent³ favored a larger military budget.

Therefore, American attitudes toward the military budget, however unstable and inconsistent they might seem, are still radically different from the mood of 1980-1981, when the majority supported higher military allocations (at a time when it was already clear that this would lead to cuts in social programs). For example, according to a NEWSWEEK poll in the first half of 1981, 58 percent favored higher military spending even if this would entail further cuts in government spending in non-military areas; 48 percent believed that higher military allocations were more important than a balanced budget.⁴ By September 1981, however, negative American attitudes toward the growth of the military budget were already fully evident.

This tendency is still present. A poll conducted in the beginning of 1984 indicated that more and more Americans are against further cuts in major social programs and favor cuts in the military budget. For example, they were in favor of reduced military expenditures and the retention of social security benefits by a majority of 76 percent to 14 percent. In a Harris poll,

71 percent of the respondents preferred cuts in military spending to cuts in funds for education (only 19 percent held the opposite opinion). Cuts in military spending instead of in veterans benefits were supported by 69 percent against 18 percent.⁵

American negative attitudes toward the continued growth of military spending were clearly reflected in their assessments of military programs and of federal assistance to cities. Whereas in 1981 the majority favored cuts in expenditures on urban needs and a commensurate rise in military spending, 54 percent in 1984 preferred cuts in military allocations to reduced aid to cities.⁶ Cuts in military spending were preferred to cuts in Medicare (old-age medical assistance) by 72 percent of the Americans as against 18 percent.⁷

The current Washington administration will stoop to any trick to put an end to this clear tendency. For example, it used the organized provocation involving the South Korean airliner to fuel militarist, anti-Soviet feelings. It was no coincidence that 57 percent of the respondents polled immediately after this incident favored a larger military budget.⁸ But this reversal in American views on military spending was short-lived.

The opinions of Americans who were once certain of the total military invulnerability of U.S. territory and of U.S. military superiority have naturally reflected the objective changes in the balance of power between capitalism and socialism, between the United States and the USSR and between imperialism and the liberation movements. The tendency toward political realism, the recognition of the relatively equal military strength of the USSR and United States and the willingness to participate in equitable and peaceful negotiations are counterbalanced by tendencies toward wounded nationalist pride and alarmist feelings. Militarist groups are taking advantage of precisely these feelings.

As mentioned above, a propaganda campaign was launched on a broad scale in the United States in the middle of the 1970's to convince Americans that the Soviet Union was using detente for a unilateral arms buildup; the false thesis of the "Soviet military threat" was constantly reiterated. As a result of these propaganda efforts, more and more Americans began to believe that the United States was lagging behind the USSR in the military sphere in the second half of the 1970's. By the middle of 1980 the majority of Americans, as public opinion polls testify, were convinced of the military superiority of the USSR, and 78 percent⁹ were seriously worried about U.S. security. It is indicative that security was no longer associated in the public mind with the achievement of an approximate balance in arms, but with military superiority.

It was difficult for the Americans, who had grown accustomed to their sense of military superiority, to believe that the existing balance between the USSR and the United States could not be disrupted. Militarist propaganda used every means at its disposal to keep them from realizing that this balance was the optimal condition for peaceful agreements. Illusions about the possibility of restoring military superiority were kept alive by this propaganda. In 1981, 54 percent of the Americans believed that the United States should do everything within its power to become stronger than the Soviet Union.¹⁰ The overwhelming majority (73 percent against 22 percent)¹¹ expressed more subtle forms of support for unconditional U.S. military superiority.

During the years of Reagan's presidency, however, American public opinion began to display clearer acknowledgement of the relative balance of Soviet and U.S. armed forces, including nuclear forces. Noticeable changes in American views on the balance of nuclear power were discovered when two Gallup polls in April and November 1982 were compared (see the percentages in the following table).

<u>Responses</u>	<u>April 1982</u>	<u>November 1982</u>
The United States is stronger	17	22
The USSR is stronger	40	30
The two countries are equal in strength	32	33
No opinion	11	15

At the same time, 83 percent of the Americans arrived at the noteworthy conclusion that it made no difference which side was ahead in nuclear weapons because both sides had enough nuclear weapons to destroy each other, and only 17 percent did not agree with this statement.¹² A minority of the respondents (34 percent)¹³ were convinced that a nuclear buildup would not heighten national security. All of this testifies that changes are taking place, even if this is an extremely slow process, in the very concept of national security, which is gradually losing its clear-cut association with the arms race.

Changes in interpretations of national security are also attested to by the lack of majority support for the Reagan Administration's widely publicized idea of "limited" nuclear war. In 1982, 75 percent of the Americans felt that any use of nuclear weapons would lead to world war.¹⁴

The propaganda about "limited" nuclear war was closely related to the advertisement of methods of surviving this kind of war. Americans are being told that the Soviet Union is spending huge amounts on civil defense in preparation for the delivery of a nuclear strike, while the United States is supposedly lagging far behind in this area. The natural conclusion is that the United States must spend much more in this area. The recognition of the implications of nuclear war, however, gradually led to a situation in which the majority of Americans were already expressing disagreement with increased allocations for civil defense in 1982 because they had doubts about the effectiveness of these measures. In connection with this, 61 percent felt that evacuation plans were unrealistic.¹⁵

Fairly broad segments of the American public took a somewhat skeptical approach to Reagan's idea of creating a broad-scale space-based ABM system. In spring 1983 the President made a speech which was later termed the "Star Wars speech." In essence, Reagan proposed that the arms race be moved to space and that lasers and other antimissile and antisatellite weapons which people had only seen in science fiction movies, be developed and deployed there. The President tried to convince the citizens of his country that the United States could escape the threat of nuclear annihilation only by establishing this space-based system. A poll conducted soon after the "Star Wars speech," however, showed

that Reagan was not able to make the Americans feel less afraid of nuclear war, and the majority (58 percent against 36 percent)¹⁶ did not approve of his plan.

The main emphasis of the "Star Wars speech" was the assurance that the new space-based weapons would be used only for defensive purposes, but the overwhelming majority of Americans took a fairly skeptical view of this: 71 percent believed that the weapons would be made part of the "pre-emptive" strike strategy, and the majority (57 percent against 37 percent)¹⁷ disagreed with the statement that the development of a new space-based weapon capable of destroying nuclear missiles was the only way of averting nuclear war. The Americans also could not agree with Reagan's statement that space-based weapons would somehow make the Soviet Union more tractable in bilateral talks; 54 percent¹⁸ could not agree that the USSR would be willing to make concessions after learning about the development of a new space-based ABM system. The history of the arms race has convinced Americans that the development of new weapon systems leads to arms buildups, and not reductions.

In this area there was a significant differences between the views of men and women on the space-based weapons. The men were equally split in their opinions of the "Star Wars" weapons--48 percent for and 48 percent against. Women definitely objected to Reagan's plan. Only 25 percent of the women polled supported this idea, while 67 percent expressed disapproval.¹⁹

This difference is significant because American women have recently displayed a clear tendency toward greater political realism than men. Numerous polls attest to this.

The number of Americans expressing pessimistic views about the future development of international events began to rise steadily in 1978. This was clearly reflected in a Gallup poll asking whether the next year would be peaceful or full of international disputes (the table indicates the results in percentage values).²⁰

<u>Year</u>	<u>Peaceful</u>	<u>Disputes</u>	<u>No opinion</u>
1978	35	45	20
1979	38	53	9
1980	14	80	6

There was a particularly noticeable increase in the number of Americans worried about the possibility of a new world war after Ronald Reagan was elected. A poll conducted in 26 countries at the end of 1982 showed that Americans were more likely than other nationalities to believe that war could break out in the next decade. The Americans ranked next to last, after the Colombians, in terms of expectations of peace in the future.²¹

A TIME magazine poll in October 1983 indicated that the lowest assessments were given to the Reagan Administration's ability to protect the United States

from possible involvement in a war. At the same time, the majority of Americans regard the risk of nuclear war as the most important and urgent issue.

A poll conducted by the Yankelovich firm at the end of last year indicated that 60 percent of the Americans were seriously disturbed by the mounting threat of nuclear war as a result of the deterioration of American-Soviet relations. Domestic political and economic issues were relegated to positions of secondary importance, as the majority of respondents (67 percent) said that the most important U.S. objective was the reduction of the danger of war.²² Recent polls indicate that the mounting fears of many Americans coexist with the belief that the United States has been closer to war than to peace under the Reagan Administration. It is no coincidence that many American experts predicted that questions of war and peace would be the key issues of the 1984 campaign.

According to a Harris poll, the number of Americans worried about the prospect of U.S. involvement in a new war is still rising. The view that the country will be "even closer to war" by 1986 is already held by 63 percent against 34 percent.²³ Fairly broad segments of the population have a pessimistic view of the President's ability to keep the peace. Only 26 percent of the respondents in a Yankelovich poll said that Reagan could "keep the United States out of war," while 32 percent believed that the Democrats would be more likely than the Republican administration to reduce the danger of war.

The majority of Americans do not believe that Ronald Reagan can secure a nuclear arms control agreement. For example, 58 percent had doubts about the possibility of a Soviet-U.S. nuclear arms limitation agreement if Reagan should be re-elected. Although the majority (56 percent against 41 percent) believe that Reagan can heighten the prestige of the United States in the world during his second term (it is no secret that he has speculated on nationalist feelings, and with some success), they are more and more disturbed by the threat of nuclear war.

The mounting fear of nuclear war and the realization of its implications by large segments of the population have made an increasing number of Americans certain of the need for arms limitation agreements with the Soviet Union and for a ban on nuclear weapons. Even in 1981, when many Americans supported Reagan's "tough" line in relations with the USSR, there were two supporters of nuclear disarmament for each of its opponents. A stable majority has favored a freeze on weapons in recent years. According to a sociological study by NEWSWEEK magazine in January 1983, 64 percent of the Americans²⁴ favored a ban on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons.

The evolution of American views--from the upsurge of militarist feelings to the subsequent reinforcement of elements of realism and fear of military adventures--can also be seen in attitudes toward the use of U.S. military force abroad. It must be said that the wording and content of these questions are sometimes of a clearly tendentious nature. For example, questions about whether or not Americans support the idea of "defending" their European allies or Japan with the use of military force in the event of hypothetical Soviet attacks on them are clearly contrived. Whereas 48 percent of the respondents

in 1974 favored the military assistance of Japan, in 1980 the number who felt that troops should be sent to defend Japan had risen to 74 percent. Whereas 48 percent supported the defense of the main European allies "in the event of a Soviet invasion" in 1974, the number was 68 percent in 1980, or even 73 percent according to other sources.²⁵

Later, however, the use of military force in the same situations began to encounter less support. For example, according to the data of NEWSWEEK magazine, the number of respondents favoring the use of American troops in the "defense" of Western Europe fell by 20 percentage points between February 1980 and June 1981 (from 73 to 53 percent).²⁶

American expressions of agreement or disagreement with the use of military force in hypothetical situations cannot always be taken as an indicator of public views on Washington's actual military behavior. Polls taken in the past testify that military intervention is generally supported at first (in the beginning of the war in Korea, at the time when the American troops were sent to the Dominican Republic in 1965, and at the beginning of the war in Vietnam) and has made presidents more popular.

The recent American invasion of Grenada was the latest example of public support of the President and of a brief outburst of militarist, chauvinistic feelings. Under the influence of provocative propaganda, alleging that the lives of American students in Grenada were in danger, and as a result of the absence of accurate information about the situation on the island after the beginning of the invasion (in the first week of the occupation, only the censored accounts of reporters connected with the Pentagon were let out of Grenada), the majority of Americans (around 70 percent) supported Washington's action. These feelings were short-lived, however, and within 2 weeks the President's popularity had declined to the level recorded in polls prior to the events in Grenada.

The public approval of intervention has given way to the condemnation of military undertakings in any crisis that has gone on for a long time or has turned into a war. This is attested to by the radical change of American views on the wars in Korea and Vietnam during the course of their escalation.

In general, Americans are more likely to support economic and diplomatic sanctions, shipments of military equipment or even the appointment of military advisers who do not take part in combat operations than the appointment of advisers who do take part in these operations and, certainly, the use of American troops abroad. For example, more than two-fifths of the Americans approved of military shipments to Zaire (1978), Somalia (1978) and El Salvador (1981) to repulse alleged threats to these countries. Less than two-fifths agreed that military advisers should be sent to these countries on the condition that they not take part in combat operations. Less than one-fifth agreed that military advisers should be sent to these countries to take part in military operations. Only one-tenth agreed that American troops should be involved in the conflicts in these countries.

Apparently, in spite of the U.S. Government's attempts to make people forget the lessons of the war against Vietnam, which President Reagan himself called

a "noble cause" and which was recently commemorated by the erection of a monument in Washington, many Americans do not want their country involved in any situations reminding them of Vietnam. Furthermore, their number is growing. For example, according to a Harris poll in April 1982, the majority (71 percent against 24 percent)²⁷ agreed that "American intervention in El Salvador looks very much like a situation capable of turning into another Vietnam," and simultaneously opposed the offer of economic and military assistance to the Salvadoran regime. In 1982 this opposition grew even stronger: Whereas 69 percent disapproved and 27 percent approved in 1981, in 1982 the figures were 72 percent and 23 percent.²⁸ In March 1983, 68 percent²⁹ disapproved of Reagan's decision to give the Salvadoran regime another 60 million dollars in military assistance. Whereas 52 percent of the Americans objected to the training of Salvadoran government troops by American advisers in 1981 (43 percent approved),³⁰ 56 percent already disapproved in 1982 and only 39 percent approved of the administration's move.³¹ In March 1983, 59 percent objected to Reagan's proposed increase in the number of American military advisers in El Salvador.³²

Public disapproval of Reagan's policy in El Salvador is still growing. In September 1983, 78 percent³³ opposed the offer of military assistance to the government of this country.

The American public did not support the measures to help counterrevolutionary forces in Nicaragua either (by a majority of 56 percent).³⁴ Even more respondents (60 percent against 24 percent) disapproved of administration policy in connection with the assistance of counterrevolutionaries fighting against the Sandinist government in January 1984. It was precisely in this context that a stable majority of Americans--62 percent against 31 percent in September 1983 and 62 percent against 29 percent in January 1984³⁵--have expressed worries about American troop maneuvers in Honduras.

The current administration's policy in Central America is viewed negatively by 54 percent of the Americans, who believe that it could start a war in this region.

Dissatisfaction with Reagan's policy in the Middle East is also growing in the country. In 1982, 54 percent of the Americans did not agree that American troops should be sent to Lebanon, although government propaganda portrayed this action as a purely peacekeeping measure. A NEWSWEEK poll in September 1983 indicated that 47 percent disapproved of U.S. armed intervention in the Middle East, 54 percent felt that there was no need whatsoever to send Marines to Lebanon, and 53 percent favored their withdrawal from Lebanon.³⁶

In recent months the administration has made some changes in the tactics it was using to gain public support for armed intervention in the Middle East. The emphasis shifted from the defense of peace and American interests in the region to the danger of the decline of U.S. national prestige in the event of a troop withdrawal. Americans were assured that the withdrawal of troops from Lebanon would hurt American national pride. As we know, however, the number of Americans disapproving of U.S. policy in this region continued to rise until the Marines were recalled.

Americans who criticize U.S. policy in the Middle East object to the sale of weapons to Arab states and to Israel, regardless of their views on these countries. The majority (64 percent)³⁷ believe that Israel should use the weapons it has already received from the United States only for defensive purposes.

In general, American attitudes toward Reagan's policy on arms exports are quite contradictory. On the one hand, they are worried that sales of weapons abroad could increase the chances of war, but on the other they favor the reinforcement of U.S. allies. The majority (55 percent against 40 percent) support sales of weapons to friendly countries but draw a clear distinction between sales and free transfers. The latter are generally not supported. In spite of the approval of sales of weapons to allies, the Americans are prepared to support a UN resolution requesting all states not to sell or transfer weapons to other countries (52 percent for and 37 percent against).³⁸

The contradictory nature of American public opinion on questions of war and peace and on existing militarist tendencies is attested to by attitudes toward the army, particularly the issue of the draft. From the very beginning, the American Army has been made up mainly of volunteers, although laws on military service have been passed several times. The latest law on compulsory service in the army was repealed in 1973 under the influence of a strong antiwar movement and public protests against recruitment for the "dirty war" in Vietnam. Since that time the U.S. Army has been manned on hiring and recruitment basis. In 1980, however, President Carter passed a law on registration for the draft. In the fear of universal military service, young people in several American cities organized protest demonstrations against registration.

With a view to this, Reagan made a campaign promise to repeal the act on registration, but it was not repealed. The principle of army recruitment is still an unresolved issue, although American attitudes toward the draft have changed in the past decade and are in sharp contrast to the mood of the early 1970's. Whereas polls in 1973 indicated that 74 percent of the Americans objected to compulsory military service, in 1979 only 46 percent opposed the draft, and in 1980 the draft was supported by the majority (59 percent against 34 percent).

The armed forces have regained some of the prestige they lost during the years of the war in Vietnam. Mass unemployment has sent more young people into the army. In 1983 enlistments in all branches of the armed forces were equivalent to 101 percent of the projected figures. The relatively high salaries of servicemen and a vigorous advertising campaign played an important role in this process. Re-enlistment figures also rose.

Although there are some indications that more and more Americans are gradually recovering from the militarist and chauvinistic fever, the ideology of anti-Sovietism is still influencing public opinion in the United States. Propaganda designed for constant intimidation with the "Soviet threat" and portraying the Soviet Union as the cause of all American troubles and of conflicts in various parts of the world is systematically sowing suspicions about the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, in spite of the widespread negative feelings about the USSR, many Americans have been influenced by the activity of peaceful forces in the country and in the rest of the world and by the peaceful initiatives of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community to support the idea of equitable and productive negotiations and to advocate agreements on the limitation of nuclear and other weapons and a freeze on these weapons.

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MORE 'MODERATE' REPUBLICAN CAMPAIGN RHETORIC SEEN

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 84 (signed to press 14 Jun 84) pp 57-60

[Article by L. A. Antonova: "Republican Campaign Rhetoric"]

[Text] Most of the content of Republic rhetoric in the current election campaign has been dictated by two tactical aims. The first consists in portraying R. Reagan's performance in the presidency in the best possible light, and the second consists in defeating the Democrats.

In 1980 the Republican Party took charge of the government, calling itself a party of national recovery and proposing new solutions for the country's most urgent socioeconomic problems. As we know, the declining prestige of the ruling Democratic Party as a result of Carter Administration foreign and domestic policy failures played an important role in the Republican victory.

The Republican platform in the 1980 campaign promised "economic growth and full employment without inflation," tax cuts and a balanced federal budget by 1984. One of the main Republican slogans in 1980 concerned the "revival of traditional values"--the family, the community and religion; for the first time, the Republican Party platform included such demands of the "New Right" as a ban on abortions and the institution of religious education in the schools. The foreign policy section of the party platform was distinguished by a desire for an arms buildup and for military superiority to the USSR, and by appeals to overcome "mental paralysis"--or, in simpler terms, not to avoid the use of armed force.

Military expenditures in subsequent years were so colossal that the federal budget deficit could not be eradicated. In fact, it increased dramatically. The social consequences of Republican economic policy, which dealt a particularly severe blow to the poorest strata of the population, were even more painful. In 1982 the number of officially registered poor hit a record high for the past 20 years--34 million. The administration's tax cuts benefited primarily Americans with high incomes. As a result, by 1981 the majority of voters believed that administration policies "benefit primarily the rich and big business."

Disillusionment with Reagan's economic policy weakened the Republican Party's position. The Republicans suffered a perceptible defeat in the 1982 midterm

elections. Not long ago the NEW YORK TIMES remarked that Reagan "had made several executive decisions which, according to his critics, are contrary to the economic and foreign policy interests of many of the people who voted for him in 1980."

As for foreign policy, here the actions of the Reagan Administration were fully consistent with its policy statements. The aggressive line of departure from detente and the substitution of military force for diplomacy, combined with new and dangerous doctrines regarding the use of military force, heightened the chances of direct U.S. involvement in military conflicts, particularly in Central America and the Middle East, and the danger of nuclear war. Talks on the limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear weapons and on medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe were cut off through the fault of the United States. The Washington administration's "peaceful" rhetoric of the past few months has changed nothing. Understandably enough, the Republican Party has now earned the reputation of a "war party" in the United States and the rest of the world.

The severity of the economic problems the administration had to face was alleviated considerably by the beginnings of a moderate economic recovery in 1983. It is true that this recovery is obviously of a cyclical nature and has little connection, according to many economists, with administration policy. When the rate of inflation slowed down, the administration was able to convince some voters that the improvement of the economic situation was the direct result of "Reaganomics." In this way, the Republican Party regained some of its trump cards by the beginning of the 1984 campaign. To a considerable extent, it has also benefited from the Democratic Party's failure to offer a credible alternative.

In this campaign the Republicans are striving to portray themselves as the "party of prosperity." The central theme of their campaign rhetoric is the thesis that the state of the American economy improved under the Reagan Administration. In his annual budget message to the Congress in 1984, the President said that the economic program he had proposed 3 years before "to solve the urgent economic and political problems engendered by earlier near-sighted and misguided policies" had increased industrial production volumes and reduced unemployment. In his state of the union message, he asserted that he was responsible for "the first tax cut for all citizens since Kennedy's time." Reagan also took the credit for the lower rate of increase in federal spending and called this a result of his "struggle against the bureaucratization of government" and of the limitation of social programs.

The budget message to the Congress contains an economic forecast. "All of the signs," it says, "point to the continuation of stable economic growth, vigorous investment and higher labor productivity without the revival of inflation." It also mentions the "achievement of full employment." In simple terms, all of this implies that economic advances have, according to the President, completely validated his economic program, proving that the Republican Administration chose the right domestic policy line, and voters should therefore give the Republicans a chance to "finish the job."

Whereas in the 1980 campaign Reagan asked the Americans: "Are you living better now than you were 4 years ago?"--in 1984 he is saying: "Americans are living better now than they were 4 years ago, but things would be much worse if the Republicans had not taken over in 1980." Although this is demagoguery in its purest form, the allegation has been repeated countless times in various forms.

The growth of the federal budget deficit, which is now around 200 billion dollars, is an extremely vulnerable spot in the Republican administration's performance. Furthermore, it was Reagan who promised to balance the budget. The Democrats are correctly stating that the increase in the budget is the result of excessive military spending and the reduction of corporate taxes. The Republican leadership is trying to take the offensive in this area as well and to seize the initiative in the campaign arguments. Reagan said at one press conference that the budget deficit was "inherited" from the Carter Administration, and that the deficit is primarily a result of its wasteful policies and might be even larger if not for the efforts of the current administration.

Reagan has proposed two constitutional amendments as the specific methods of eradicating the federal budget deficit. The first would make a balanced federal budget compulsory and the second would give the President the authority to veto specific sections of appropriations bills to secure his control over federal credit programs. He is assuring the voters that his budget program will reduce the deficit by 100 billion dollars in the next 3 years. The President resolutely objects to the Democratic proposals that the budget deficit be reduced by cutting defense spending and raising some taxes. He is also promising the voters a new tax cut "for all citizens" and is demagogically declaring: "Simple justice demands that the government not raise taxes on the incomes of families having trouble paying their bills." In 1982, however, the administration increased indirect taxes, and these have the most adverse effect precisely on the poorest families.

Although Reagan stressed that the reduction of federal spending was still an important aim of his administration, he has said nothing in his campaign speeches about further cuts in social programs. The fact is that in recent years the administration has essentially reconciled itself to a higher level of social spending than it had originally planned. After all, further cuts in social spending could undermine the party's mass political base. For this reason, in his campaign statements Reagan has either ignored the touchy issue of social allocations or has made general statements to the effect that administration activity "saved the social security system from the threat of insolvency as a result of the unrestrained rise of inflation, excessive liberalization and a weak tax base."

The earlier slogan of "new federalism," envisaging the transfer of several federal programs to the states, is absent from Republican rhetoric in this campaign. When Reagan spoke at a conference of the National Urban League, he discussed the creation of commercial zones and avoided any further mention of the decentralization of social policy in the spirit of the "new federalism." This new plan envisages the creation of special zones in depressed regions. The zones would be created by the states and would be given certain tax breaks.

According to the plans of the Republican administration, this should serve as a substitute for increased federal assistance to cities experiencing financial crisis. The President went on to say that the improvement of the economic situation in the nation as a whole would help in the resolution of urban problems. Reagan said that the fight against crime and for better education should be given priority in this area.

Talk about the "revival of traditional ideals" is still prominent in the campaign statements of Republican Party leaders. In his state of the union message, Reagan repeated that the "consolidation of traditional ideals" was one of the administration's principal aims. In line with this slogan, the Republicans are lavish with promises to improve the quality of education, lead the fight against crime and so forth.

The main purpose of Republican campaign rhetoric is to give "Reaganism" a more moderate image. This also applies to foreign policy issues. Judging by all indications, this is the administration's most vulnerable spot in the present campaign.

Public opinion polls indicate that Reagan's aggressive foreign policy has made the issues of "war and peace" the primary concern of voters. On 11 April, famous correspondent J. Reston had this to say in the NEW YORK TIMES: "Foreign policy is obviously becoming the main issue in the presidential campaign." The next few months will show whether or not this is the case.

According to R. Teather, one of the Republican leadership's political advisers, Reagan could be hurt by three aspects of foreign policy activity: first, the U.S. role in various parts of the world (Central America, the Middle East and others); secondly, the arms control talks; thirdly, the increase in defense spending. The escalation of the arms race, the lack of progress in arms control and the disruption of the Geneva talks have been pointedly criticized by Democrats.

Reagan is trying to refute this criticism by alleging that increased military expenditures have made it possible for him to restore America's military strength and thereby guarantee its greater security. What is more, the President is telling the voters that his efforts have "made peace stronger." Vice-President G. Bush declared that "Reagan's efforts to restore the potential for deterrence and to negotiate arms reductions are based on a real desire to get rid of all nuclear weapons." Bush has even said that his role in the campaign debates will consist in assuring the voters of the absolute sincerity of the President's convictions.

The Republican leadership is trying to portray its party as the "peace party." It has departed from the rhetoric of the "crusade" against the socialist countries and is saying nothing about the plans to use nuclear weapons first. In his state of the union message, Reagan made suggestions that were supposed to convince the voters of his "love of peace." He set the following immediate objectives in the foreign policy sphere: a "more stable basis" for peaceful relations with the USSR; stronger relations with allies in all areas; "real and just" nuclear arms reductions. At the same time, Reagan is contradicting

himself by resolutely opposing cuts in his record military budget, alleging that the federal government "cannot allow itself to shirk its responsibility to guarantee America freedom, security and peace."

In the campaign statements of its leaders, therefore, the Republican Party is described as a "party of peace and prosperity," which successfully stopped the "decline of national spirit and strength" and thereby earned a mandate "to finish the job."

In fact, however, Republican policy has not changed. Only the rhetoric has changed, and this has been done to win votes.

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REAGAN POLICY ON SOUTHERN AFRICA ASSAILED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 84 (signed to press 14 Jun 84) pp 61-66

[Article by V. A. Martynov: "Washington, Africa and the U.S. Elections"]

[Text] The speech U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz presented on 16 February of this year in Boston to the members of the Council on Foreign Relations, with a detailed statement on African affairs and U.S. relations with African countries, can definitely be called part of the election campaign, which acquired new dimensions when Ronald Reagan officially announced his intention to run for re-election. Top members of the current Republican administration are now actively involved in the campaign, publicizing the Republicans' "achievements" in domestic and foreign policy and discussing some of the aims and premises that are slated to constitute the basis of the new campaign platform.

From this vantage point, Shultz' statement is something like a summary of Reagan Administration performance in Africa in the past three and a half years and an assessment of the situation on the continent.

Africa's importance to the United States has traditionally been judged on two bases: firstly, the geopolitical or "strategic" basis (the alleged strategic importance of sea lanes directly adjacent to the African coastline, particularly around the Cape of Good Hope) and, secondly, the economic basis (Africa is a source of raw materials vitally necessary to the American economy). Finally, Africa is also important on the political level, although to a slightly lesser degree, in connection with the procedure of voting in the United Nations, in which African states represent almost one-third of all members.

All of these aspects were mentioned--and in precisely this order--in the statement by the U.S. secretary of state. This time, however, they were accompanied by a new factor, which is not new in principle but is extraordinary for the Republican Party. This is the "purely human," in Shultz' words, factor in U.S. relations with African countries. It is no secret that African affairs and American-African relations are of special interest to the black population of the United States, particularly its most active political representatives in labor unions, student groups, other public organizations, the U.S. Congress,

etc. There is no question that the "African lobby" does not have much direct influence on U.S. foreign policymaking, but its pressure can be significant in the context of American domestic politics in view of the large number of black voters and in view of the fact that one of the contenders for the Democratic nomination in this campaign is J. Jackson, a black American. Just in time for the election, the Republican Administration discovered that, in Shultz' words, "11 percent of the American population can trace its genealogy back to Africa, and all of us are living in a society in which this human and cultural heritage has had a colossal influence."

Shultz singled out three main aspects of U.S. strategy in southern Africa: the creation of a "general structure for regional security," a desire to secure Namibia's independence and the effort to promote "positive changes in South Africa's apartheid policy."

The Reagan Administration's policy in southern Africa was once worked out in detail by the present Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs C. Crocker before he was appointed to this position, when he was a researcher at Georgetown University; at that time the policy was christened "constructive influence." In essence, it consisted in more active contacts with the internationally isolated apartheid regime, supposedly for the purpose of exerting a beneficial influence on it. The United States' aims were supposed to be the promotion of internal reforms in South Africa and the regulation of its relations with its neighbors, especially Angola and Mozambique. By the end of the 1970's the issue of apartheid had become a permanent element of American-South African contacts. American policy toward South Africa prior to 1976 clearly proved that the unconcealed support of the racist regime under the conditions of a mounting national liberation struggle in the region could only undermine Washington's influence on the African continent. For this reason, in 1976 American diplomatic efforts in southern Africa were aimed at promoting "peaceful" or "constructive" changes within the racist government--that is, "plastic surgery" on the apartheid regime--in order to retain it as the United States' main ally and supporter in Africa.

On the analytical level, the doctrine of "constructive influence" as a whole validated a departure from the regionalist approach to African affairs, viewed U.S. policy in Africa within the context of global confrontation with the Soviet Union and put the emphasis on ideological factors of American interests in southern Africa. It was the "Soviet factor," and not the vague talk about humanitarianism and common human justice, that soon became the main issue, although certainly not officially, in the resolution of the problem of Namibia, which the Reagan Administration called the key problem of the new stage of American-South African relations. A 1981 State Department memorandum said that an internationally acceptable settlement in Namibia should "secure South Africa's interests and reflect our common desire to prevent Soviet successes in southern Africa, and...if South Africa takes part in reaching this settlement, this will help considerably in the efforts to repulse the Soviet threat."

The response to Reagan's strategy in South Africa was positive. Editor B. Pogrand of the RAND DAILY MAIL, a South African newspaper, had this to say in an article in the American magazine NEW REPUBLIC in fall 1981: "Reagan's

policy in South Africa is part of the global policy of counteracting the presence and influence of the Soviet Union wherever possible, and the emphasis is on U.S. and Western economic and strategic interests. As far as the racial conflict in South Africa is concerned, U.S. interests are not governed by the consideration of human rights, but by the risk of its potential effect on American interests."

The Reagan Administration's "constructive" approach to relations with the South African Government had completely predictable results. The U.S. political, military and economic support of the apartheid regime strengthened the repressive framework of racism, allowed for the even harsher persecution of all signs of opposition within the country and gave this regime a chance to renounce the promised minor reforms of the system of apartheid. The growing influence of the most intransigent elements in the white population, acting under the slogan of absolute anti-reformism, which was reflected in the results of the April 1981 parliamentary elections and in the split of the National Party in June 1982, also attests to a further shift toward extreme conservatism in South African politics.

It is not surprising that G. Shultz essentially ignored the internal situation in South Africa when he spoke in Boston, confining his discussion to standard statements about "the disgust the U.S. Government feels for the system of apartheid." On the other hand, he said that the move toward stronger regional security in southern Africa, with the "active and energetic support of the United States," was "clearly positive." The secretary of state tried to portray the United States as the "catalyst of progress" in the stabilization of regional affairs. Shultz asserted that the efforts of the United States and its partners in the "contact group" had supposedly eliminated the last unsolved problems impeding the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435 (on the withdrawal of South African troops from occupied territory in Namibia and the holding of UN-supervised elections there).

It would be difficult to say whether Shultz' remarks contained more obsessive self-congratulation or overt misinformation. The military-intelligence cooperation between the United States and South Africa, which was temporarily curtailed in J. Carter's time, was resumed in full under the Republican administration. Contacts in the nuclear sphere have continued. According to reports in the African press, the construction of testing grounds for cruise missiles is being completed in South Africa. Correctly interpreting the Republican President's verbal signals and actions, the Pretoria regime intensified its policy of terror and military ventures against neighboring states at the beginning of the 1980's: It organized a broad-scale invasion of Angola in summer 1981 and invasions of Mozambique and Zambia in the winter of 1983/84. The South African Government virtually cut off the talks with the "contact group" on the granting of independence to Namibia, displaying no desire to agree to any kind of compromise, even with the lenient position of the Western powers. By linking the issue of Namibian independence with the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, the United States is actually supporting Pretoria's obstructionist position.

The professional campaign optimism G. Shultz displayed in his evaluation of Reagan Administration performance in southern Africa stems primarily from the

fact that it was precisely the Republicans who not only made the independence of Namibia an integral element of their southern African doctrine 3 years ago, but also turned the resolution of this issue into the main justification of their broader cooperation with the racist regime. Washington tried to compensate for its support of the apartheid system by making a pretense of settling the Namibian question and demonstrating its "good intentions" to solve all problems in southern Africa. But since all of these problems essentially consist in, besides the apartheid regime itself, South Africa's continuous aggressive actions against its neighbors, the United States had to eventually agree to political contacts with the governments of Angola and Mozambique and representatives of SWAPO. In addition to securing its own interests, the United States is also carrying out the voluntarily accepted duty of cleaning up South Africa's image in the region. This is the reason for the heightened activity of American diplomatic emissaries, with all of the attributes of Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy," supposedly for the purpose of securing the settlement of the Namibian problem and putting a stop to military operations in the region. The relationship between the United States and South Africa not only entails close cooperation, but also a unique division of labor. Although Washington has actually encouraged the racists to attack their neighbors, it has assumed the role of "peacemaker" by offering mediating services, while Pretoria has demonstrated its willingness for the "peaceful" settlement of existing conflicts under Washington's auspices. This was precisely the scenario of South Africa's latest aggressive action in Angola in the winter of 1983/84.

On 5 January of this year the NEW YORK TIMES remarked that "the only result of the 'constructive influence' has been the encouragement of South African military operations against Angola.... It is completely obvious that the Reagan Administration's attempts at a reconciliation with South Africa were taken by the latter as a sign of weakness. In the certainty that it is protected on all sides by the United States, the Pretoria regime believes that it can continue along its lawless road with impunity." In an article in the same newspaper on 1 February, Professor W. Voltz criticized the administration's policy in Africa for its "increasingly compromising support of the South African regime, whose relations with its neighbors are having a destructive effect on peace in the region and on American prestige in Africa and the rest of the world."

It was under these conditions that Washington's well-organized cooperation with Pretoria produced its results. As NEWSWEEK magazine reported on 13 February, "Reagan won new concessions from South Africa (that is, the aggressor's consent to withdraw troops from occupied foreign territory) to show the voters that his policy of 'constructive influence' works."

The reaction in Washington and Pretoria to the results of South Africa's talks with Angola and Mozambique in February and March 1984 and their assessment of the significance of these talks once again confirmed, as if this kind of confirmation were necessary, that the behavior of the American and South African governments in southern Africa represented a well-rehearsed play in which the actors understood each other without words. When Botha agreed to the talks, he gave the American President the very trump card he needed, however minor it may seem, in his campaign. In Washington this is interpreted as an extension of the mandate to pursue the policy of "constructive influence."

Incidentally, there were no new reasons for any kind of illusions on this score. By March of this year, the prime minister of South Africa had put forth "new" proposals on Namibia, again linking the resolution of this problem with the withdrawal of the Cuban contingent of troops from Angola, granting the head of the Angolan rebels, J. Savimbi, the status of a full participant in the talks and, in general, trying to bypass UN Resolution 435. Of course, people in Washington said that they had known nothing about this in advance.

This is how an unprincipled and amoral policy was turned into a campaign factor. It is possible that the South African Government will soon make new promises to cooperate in the name of progress in the granting of independence to Namibia. The process itself has been hopelessly delayed through the joint efforts of the two "friendly states"--South Africa and the United States--and the matter is still not going beyond promises, just as it did not go beyond them in the past, although even the promises alone can be added to the unimpressive assets of Washington's African policy for campaign purposes.

G. Shultz' statement in Boston was not confined to an examination of the situation in southern Africa. He devoted considerable attention to the economic problems of the continent and to the "contribution" the Republican administration has made and plans to make to their resolution. The main elements of administration economic policy in Africa are known: There is an indisputable political motive for all of its aspects. In this context, the head of the U.S. foreign policy establishment announced that the President had asked the Congress to authorize a billion dollars in food and economic assistance to Africa in 1985 and that he intended to propose a "new special program" for another 500 million dollars in assistance to African countries in the next 5 years (for the sake of comparison, we should consider that the United States' "friend," South Africa, is spending at least 1.5 billion dollars a year, according to the 13 February issue of TIME magazine, on its campaign of terror against neighboring independent African states). Shultz did not conceal the fact that even this small cooky was not being offered for altruistic reasons. "We will not be distributing these funds in advance," he said, "but will respond to constructive economic reforms wherever and whenever this occurs.... We will continue to emphasize the development of the private sector in Africa.... We will provide technical assistance in changing existing laws and social institutions for the attraction of capital investments...and in publicizing profitable opportunities for investment in Africa."

The last 3 years have been marked by a prevalence of American aid through bilateral channels instead of international financial organizations. The reduction of contributions to the IBRD, IMF and other international organizations and the replacement of these with increased American aid through bilateral channels are intended to attach the policy of the African states even more closely to the economic needs of U.S. imperialism and to impose the U.S. economic model on them, regardless of whether it meets their own needs or not. For example, food assistance is made conditional upon the cancellation of agricultural subsidies for recipients and the pricing of agricultural products according to the laws of the free market. In the developing countries this unavoidably leads to a dramatic rise in food prices. This is essentially nothing other than an African variation on the Marshall Plan philosophy, which was tested almost 40 years ago and was designed to prevent progressive political processes and reforms by means of economic pressure and blackmail.

Judging by G. Shultz' remarks, the United States is prepared to use any methods, including brutal economic diktat, to keep the independent African countries in the capitalist orbit and to stop and, wherever possible, reverse political and socioeconomic processes inconsistent with the global aims and interests of American policy.

After choosing a line of global political, economic and ideological confrontation with the Soviet Union from the very beginning, the current U.S. administration subordinated its economic policy and its bilateral political relations with various countries to the interests of this confrontation. The Republican Party platform adopted in July 1980 at the convention in Detroit proceeded from the assumption that "much is at stake in Africa, and the United States...has vital interests there--economic, strategic and political." If elected, the Republicans were to exert pressure "toward real progress in the attainment of goals compatible with American ideals." It was at that time that Director K. Adelman of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, who was then still a researcher, wrote in his book "African Realities" that "American policy toward Africa should be part of the global plan of America and its allies to promote the spread of Western values in Africa and defeat" the policies of the USSR. The actions Reagan took during the first year of his term in office gave American political analysts reason to state that he "views his policy in Africa as a projection of the power struggle with the Soviet Union."

Just over 3 years ago the natural reaction to the "new" U.S. approach on the part of the African countries, which were displeased with the unconcealed contempt for their interests, did not evoke any special emotions in Washington. People there were guided by strictly realistic calculations connected with the African states' considerable political and, in particular, economic dependence on the West, including the United States. For various reasons, with campaign considerations prominent among them, the U.S. secretary of state glossed over America's indifference toward the real problems of the African countries when he spoke in Boston. In a direct retort to the administration's critics, Shultz said: "We are not looking at Africa through the prism of East-West rivalry.... We are not Africa's policeman," but "we cannot stand by and do nothing when friendly states are threatened by our own adversaries." "We are prepared," he explained, "to join others in helping our friends in the sphere of combat training and giving them armed support."

In general, the assessments of policy during the last three and a half years, descriptions of the current situation and predictions in Shultz' speech combined to make up a fairly clear picture of U.S. relations with African countries. The picture is dominated by the desire to continue exploiting African natural resources, strengthening the system of private enterprise with the aid of capital investments and dollar injections in the form of so-called aid and, if necessary, propping up corrupt reactionary regimes with American weapons, rationalizing all of this interventionism with talk about the mythical "Soviet threat." This picture does not include any significant new features, with the exception of the unceremonious manner in which Washington's plans for Africa are being announced.

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BOOK ON U.S. ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC INTERESTS IN CHINA REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 84 (signed to press 14 Jun 84) pp 109-110

[Review by G. D. Sukharchuk of book "SShA i Kitay: ekonomicheskiye i nauchno-tekhnicheskiye aspekty kitayskoy politiki Vashingtona" [The United States and China: Economic and Scientific Aspects of Washington's China Policy] by A. A. Nagornyy and A. B. Parkanskiy, Moscow, Nauka, 1982, 215 pages]

[Text] The authors discuss the development and present state of Sino-American economic contacts and relations in detail. This detailed scientific analysis paints a huge picture of increasingly strong economic ties between the two countries with an obvious tendency toward the dependence of Chinese "modernization" programs on the actions of American transnational corporations and on Washington policies.

Despite the rapid growth of American-Chinese trade in the first few years after the normalization of U.S.-PRC relations, American corporations are still unable to crowd their rivals from Japan and the EEC countries or Australian and Canadian grain exporters out of the Chinese market (p 77). This is evidently one of the reasons for the tenacious illusions of American supporters of trade with China, who believe that the Chinese market has not revealed all of its potential as yet, and that trade with China could produce billions in profit if it were intensified.

The authors trace various stages in the history of the PRC's trade and economic contacts with the United States and with the capitalist countries in general. In the first half of the 1970's, following the devastation and isolation to which Beijing sentenced itself during the years of the "Cultural Revolution," the PRC was simply seeking ways of reviving and developing existing contacts. In particular, China augmented trade with the West (including Japan) at an impressive rate. In the second half of the 1970's, when the soil had been prepared and when people in Beijing realized that a favorable political moment had arrived, the PRC began ordering many types of heavy and complex equipment. The Chinese orders roused Western businessmen to action. In the fear of being left behind by competitors, they were prepared to deliver anything the Chinese wanted to the PRC on relatively preferential terms.

The authors present an extremely precise description of the tactical outlines of Chinese foreign trade practices after 1978, when Beijing had to cancel many

of its excessive orders and began "seeking more convenient terms by stopping the work on several projects" (p 80).

The book contains a detailed and competent description of all the "pros" and "cons" of American investment in China. The analysis proves that American corporations are in no hurry to water the Chinese soil with the rain of their investments. Although they realize that the PRC economy is still experiencing difficulties, they are expressing their dissatisfaction even with the sizeable tax privileges the Chinese Government is offering them. They would prefer to play a waiting game and act "in a highly conservative manner," as American trade expert K. Llewellyn described this position in 1980 (p 109). The authors reveal the real reasons why American transnational corporations and even smaller businessmen have been so slow and seemingly reluctant to export capital to the PRC: On the one hand, they can benefit more from difficulties in the Chinese economy and, on the other, they are reluctant to nurture a potential powerful competitor in Asia.

The authors reveal all of the contradictions in the economic cooperation between the United States and the PRC, analyzing and assessing all of the stimulating and restricting factors. In particular, they point out the fact that the normalization of Sino-American relations and the prospect of economic contacts with the PRC did not change American capital's short- and long-range plans for Taiwan. Transnational corporations are still expanding their operations there. This is also true of the corporations of other capitalist countries.

The authors thoroughly analyze numerous facts, figures and excerpts from American official sources, articles and reports by politicians and members of the academic community. These materials clearly testify to the egotistical approach of U.S. ruling circles to relations with the PRC, and to their intention to enslave the PRC economy through debts, through deliveries of equipment and through the retention of a monopoly on complex equipment. The latest models of this equipment are never sent to the PRC and never will be, and this is not due only to ideological and political considerations, but also to the effects of imperialist commercial calculations.

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BOOK ON U.S.-CANADIAN ECONOMIC TIES REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 84 (signed to press 14 Jun 84) pp 111-113

[Review by S. F. Molochkov of book "SShA-Kanada: Regional'nyy khozyaystvennyy kompleks" [U.S.-Canada: Regional Economic Complex] by A. D. Borodayevskiy, Moscow, Mysl', 1983, 225 pages]

[Text] This book is of interest because it is the first Soviet comprehensive study of the North American type of capitalist integration, based on an analysis of the U.S.-Canadian regional economic complex. For this reason, it will be of indisputable interest to a broad range of specialists.

First of all, the author singles out the distinctive features of integration processes in North America. In contrast to Western Europe, where the way was paved for the accelerated internationalization of production and capital by the creation of a supranational economic and political mechanism, here this kind of international mechanism is still lacking, and there are no joint institutions similar to EEC national bodies. This is due not to the immaturity of integration processes in this region, but, as the author correctly points out, to the strength of the American transnational corporations, the effectiveness of their organizational structure of regional business with a private monopolist basis, and the severity of U.S.-Canadian governmental conflicts (p 48).

Because the integration in North America is being developed on a capitalist basis, it is naturally producing far from equal results for its participants, which are divided by an approximately tenfold difference in overall scales of economic activity and in many deciding parameters--population size, GNP size, etc. (p 9). In the United States this objective process, as the author points out, "strengthened the American economy even more by providing it with a solid raw material foundation, creating stimuli in the form of a large regional market and offering opportunities for the profitable and strategically important investment of capital" (p 54).

The author then arrives at the sound conclusion that "it is precisely the regional integration complex, and not simply the U.S. economy, that now constitutes the economic foundation on which the strength of the American center of imperialism is based," and that "even in this stage of North American integration, U.S. imperialism is already engineering its foreign policy with a

view to the combined strength of the two countries" (ibid.). This statement seems extremely important and we can only hope that it will be given consideration in the future. In particular, it is significant that North American integration is strengthening the U.S. position in competition with the two other centers of imperialism--Western Europe and Japan--and is simultaneously stimulating the further intensification of this rivalry (p 210).

As the weaker and more passive partner, Canada has received a relatively small share of the advantages and a disproportionately large share of the socio-economic drawbacks and missed opportunities. From the very beginning, the economic convergence of the two North American countries "developed as a system for the attachment of Canada to the American industrial 'nucleus' in the capacity of a raw material 'periphery'" (p 41). Various aspects of this process--in the areas of joint investment, bilateral trade, the resource sector and the processing industry--are analyzed separately in the book.

The author stresses that the prevailing form of capital export from the United States to Canada--direct investments--most accurately reflects the integrative content of regional economic ties (p 67). It is this form that is allowing American corporations to exercise the necessary extension of production control and management functions across the border to Canada (p 68).

Direct American investments are making the Canadian economy firmly dependent on the U.S. market and are limiting Canada's national sovereignty over its own economic development, and this is being resisted more and more by national capital.

It is interesting that after the end of World War II the Canadian bourgeoisie's attempts to stimulate the flow of foreign capital (from America) were gradually replaced by its attempts to control this process effectively and subordinate it to the goals of its own enrichment. In our day, this is reflected in the efforts to "Canadize" the economy, the most obvious signs of which are the activities of the Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA), created in 1974, and the National Energy Program (NEP), announced in fall 1980. Although the authority of the FIRA is obviously limited and has not been used consistently, the creation of this agency and its activity constitute a major step of fundamental importance "toward the establishment of government control over the activities of foreign monopolies in Canada," especially American ones (p 77). The NEP, designed to Canadize the country's fuel and energy base, has served as a strong incentive for the centralization of capital in this sector on a national basis.

In the past decade the growth of American investments in Canada, which are the main motive and centralizing element of the regional economic complex, has been accompanied by the acceleration of joint investment processes and the rapid growth of Canadian investments in the United States. As the author remarks, "the present form of development is distinguished by the more steady augmentation of the role of Canadian monopolist capital in the North American economy" (p 86).

In the sphere of trade, the economic convergence of Canada and the United States has taken the form of a tremendous concentration (more than two-thirds

on the average) of exports and imports in the American market. What is more, more than half of Canada's exports are unprocessed raw materials and semi-manufactured goods, while over two-thirds of its imports are finished manufactured goods. The integrative convergence of the two economies is so strong that various attempts by Canadians to correct the onesided framework of their foreign trade have not produced any perceptible results (pp 91-92).

Canadian-American conflicts in recent years have made themselves most apparent in the resource sector of the Canadian economy, the foundations of which were laid in the 1950's and 1960's and mainly by American corporations for their own needs. Experience has corroborated the opinion of Canadian economists, cited in the book, that measures to broaden the scales of raw material processing in Canada could become a major source of conflicts in American-Canadian relations (p 131). It is precisely in this area that Americans have to deal with the national state-monopolist circles responsible for deciding Ottawa's foreign policy line, which has secured the strong attachment of Canadian power engineering to the American energy sector up to the present time (p 142).

The future economic and political development of Canada will depend largely on the outcome of the struggle for free trade between the two countries by the supporters of unlimited convergence with the United States.

As the author demonstrates, the majority of sectors of the Canadian processing industry (with the exception of agricultural machine building, military production and the automotive industry, which have already been integrated) are distinguished by common structural weaknesses and inadequate competitive potential (pp 172, 175). The institution of free trade could inflict heavy losses on them (p 180). What is more, the comprehensive liberalization of trade with the United States could erode Canada's national sovereignty, not only in the economic sphere but eventually in the sphere of responsible socio-political decisionmaking (p 186).

It is understandable that this matter is the focus of a constant political struggle in Canada, the outcome of which cannot be predicted at present.

After assessing the prospects for North American integration, the author arrives at the sound conclusion that "current difficulties in the world and on the subcontinent are objectively impeding major tendencies toward disintegration...within the regional economic system and major intergovernmental decisions capable of stimulating integration processes" (p 204).

A. D. Borodayevskiy's book will make a substantial contribution to the Soviet study of American affairs in general and Canadian affairs in particular.

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CHRONICLE OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS (MARCH-MAY 1984)

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 84 (signed to press 14 Jun 84) pp 126-127

[Text] March

2 -- Comrade K. U. Chernenko addressed the electors of the Kuybyshev Electoral District in Moscow. In reference to the U.S. administration's appeals for a "dialogue" with the USSR, K. U. Chernenko specifically said: "The entire world is aware of the sharp contradiction between these statements and what the U.S. administration has said and, what is most important, what it has done in the past and is still doing in its relations with the Soviet Union. Assurances of its good intentions can only be taken seriously if they are reinforced by real action. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has always favored a search for mutually acceptable solutions to specific problems for the benefit of both countries and for the benefit of peace."

8 -- A TASS statement on the dangerous U.S. actions in the Persian Gulf zone was published.

8-20 -- The sixth conference of Soviet and American writers was held in the American city of Malibu (California).

11 -- Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, received U.S. Ambassador A. Hartman at his request. They discussed aspects of Soviet-American relations and some current international issues.

21 -- A. A. Gromyko sent a U.S. charge d'affairs in the USSR a note from the Soviet Government in connection with the mining of the Soviet tanker "Lugansk" on 20 March near the Nicaraguan port of Sandino. The Soviet Government blamed the U.S. Government for this grave crime.

A session of the Soviet-American Standing Consultative Commission, created in 1972 to aid in the implementation of the goals and provisions of the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty, the Soviet-U.S. Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and the Soviet-U.S. Agreement on Measures To Reduce the Danger of Nuclear War, began in Geneva.

30 -- A delegation representing the American organization "Physicians for Social Responsibility," headed by Doctor Sidney Alexander, arrived in the USSR.

April

1 -- The second meeting of Soviet and American jurists came to an end in Washington. It was attended by members of the Attorneys United for the Prevention of Nuclear War organization and a delegation from the Association of Soviet Jurists.

3 -- A. A. Gromyko received U.S. Ambassador A. Hartman. They discussed Soviet-American relations and some international issues of mutual interest.

9 -- K. U. Chernenko's answers to PRAVDA's questions, including questions about the present state of Soviet-American relations, were published.

16 -- A PRAVDA editorial "The Futile Attempts of the Liars in Washington," on the third edition of the Pentagon brochure "Soviet Military Power," was published.

17-19 -- A delegation of congressmen concerned about the status of women visited Moscow. A meeting in a committee of the USSR Parliamentary Group was attended by Chairman of the USSR Parliamentary Group and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of the Union L. N. Tolkunov and USSR Supreme Soviet deputies G. A. Arbatov and Z. M. Kruglova. The delegation visited the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences, and the IZVESTIYA editorial offices. Members of the delegation spoke with members of the Committee of Soviet Women.

20 -- Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Candidate for Membership in the CPSU Central Committee Politburo V. I. Dolgikh spoke at a festive meeting in the Kremlin commemorating the 114th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth. He discussed the present state of Soviet-American relations.

27-28 -- Soviet-American consultations were held in Moscow in connection with the Stockholm conference on confidence-building measures, security and disarmament in Europe.

May

2 -- The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement to the U.S. ambassador in Moscow in connection with the flagrant provocation at Dulles Airport in Washington against Soviet citizen S. M. Kozlov, who was subjected to blackmail and pressure by various Americans, including officials from the State Department, to prevent his return to the Soviet Union.

3 -- An article on "Washington Speculations Involving Arms Control" (on the curtailment of arms limitation talks by the United States) was printed in PRAVDA.

4-22 -- A delegation of religious leaders from the USSR visited the United States.

8 -- A statement explaining why it would be impossible for Soviet athletes to participate in the 23d Olympic Games in Los Angeles was adopted at a meeting of the USSR National Olympic Committee.

7-14 -- A delegation from the American Bar Association, headed by Chairman W. Reilly, visited the USSR at the invitation of the Association of Soviet Jurists. Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of the Union L. N. Tolkunov received the delegation. Gatherings were also held in the USSR Ministry of Justice, the USSR Supreme Court and the Association of Soviet Jurists.

14-17 -- The 14th Dartmouth meeting of Soviet and U.S. public spokesmen, a regular unofficial forum for the exchange of ideas, the discussion of differences and the discovery of common interests, was held at Dartmouth College in Hanover (New Hampshire).

18 -- The latest session of the Soviet-American Standing Consultative Commission, created to aid in the implementation of the goals and provisions of the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty and Soviet-U.S. Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of 26 May 1972 and the Soviet-U.S. Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Danger of Nuclear War of 30 September 1971, came to an end in Geneva.

20 -- General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium K. U. Chernenko's response to a letter from American scientists was published.

21 -- Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, USSR Minister of Defense and Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov's replies to a TASS correspondent's questions, including an assessment of the international situation and the American administration's "double-dealing" in the issue of nuclear arms limitation, were published.

22-25 -- The eighth annual meeting of the American-Soviet Trade and Economic Council, uniting around 200 major American corporations and Soviet trade organizations, was held in New York.

27 -- A PRAVDA editorial "Dishonest Behavior in a Serious Matter," about the program for the chemical re-arming of the United States and the American side's disruption of chemical weapon ban negotiations, was published.

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